This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 et seq. (1989 Act). A contested case hearing was held on November 1, 2001. The hearing officer resolved the disputed issues by determining that the appellant (claimant) did not sustain a compensable injury on ___________, and had no disability from a compensable injury. The claimant appealed the hearing officer’s determinations on sufficiency of the evidence grounds and the respondent (self-insured) responded, urging affirmance.
DECISION
Affirmed.
The self-insured alleges that the claimant’s request for review fails to invoke the jurisdiction of the Appeals Panel because it fails to state grounds for review and does not meet the requirements of Section 410.202(c) and Tex. W.C. Comm’n, 28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 143.3(a)(2) (Rule 143.3(a)(2)). No particular form of appeal is required and an appeal, even though terse or inartfully worded, will be considered. Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 91131, decided February 12, 1992; Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 93040, decided March 1, 1993. Generally, an appeal which lacks specificity will be treated as a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 92081, decided April 14, 1992. We consider the claimant’s appeal to be a minimally sufficient challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the hearing officer’s resolution of the two interrelated issues, injury and disability.
The claimant testified that as a result of reaching for documents at work for the employer on ___________, her arm felt tired; that she began to experience pain in her right shoulder; that she was diagnosed as having a rotator cuff tear, which her doctor attributed to her activities at work; and that as a result of the injury, she was taken off work until May 30, 2001, when she was released to return to light duty. The self-insured presented evidence to support its assertion that the claimant had no compensable injury and that the claimant’s condition was caused by an ordinary disease of life.
The hearing officer made findings of fact and concluded that the claimant did not sustain a compensable injury on ___________. The claimant had the burden to prove that she was injured in the course and scope of her employment. There is conflicting evidence in this case. The 1989 Act makes the hearing officer the sole judge of the weight and credibility to be given to the evidence. Section 410.165(a). As the trier of fact, the hearing officer may believe all, part, or none of the testimony of any witness. Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 950084, decided February 28, 1995. The finder of fact may believe that the claimant has an injury, but disbelieve the claimant’s testimony that the injury occurred at work, as claimed. Johnson v. Employers Reinsurance Corporation, 351 S.W.2d 936 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1961, no writ). A fact finder is not bound by the testimony (or evidence) of a medical witness where the credibility of that testimony (or evidence) is manifestly dependent upon the credibility of the information imparted to the medical witness by the claimant. Rowland v. Standard Fire Insurance Company, 489 S.W.2d 151 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1972, writ ref’d n.r.e.). An appellate level body is not a fact finder and does not normally pass upon the credibility of witnesses or substitute its judgment for that of the trier of fact, even if the evidence would support a different result. Appeal No. 950084, supra. When reviewing a hearing officer’s decision to determine the factual sufficiency of the evidence, we should set aside the decision only if it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust. Appeal No. 950084. We conclude that the hearing officer’s findings, conclusions, and decision are supported by sufficient evidence and that they are not so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust. Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986).
We affirm the hearing officer’s decision and order.
The true corporate name of the insurance carrier is (a self-insured governmental entity) and the name and address of its registered agent for service of process is
RV
ADDRESS
(CITY), TEXAS (ZIP CODE).
Philip F. O’Neill – Appeals Judge
CONCUR:
Judy L. S. Barnes – Appeals Judge
Susan M. Kelley – Appeals Judge