This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 et seq. (1989 Act). A contested case hearing was held on November 6, 2001. The hearing officer held that the appellant’s (claimant) herniated lumber disc, resulting from a fall at home in __________, did not result from his original compensable lumbar injury of __________.
The claimant appeals the hearing officer’s determination, arguing that he would not have fallen at home, sustaining a herniated L3-4 disc, except for the weakness in his legs brought about by his original compensable back injury. The respondent (self-insured) responds that the law was correctly applied.
DECISION
We affirm.
As noted, the facts were essentially undisputed. The claimant injured his back on the job on __________, and had discectomy and fusion surgery for a L4-5 herniated disc, the last surgery being 1994. He continued to have pain, however. A letter from the claimant’s treating doctor stated that, in connection with assessing an impairment rating in November 1995, the claimant had no obvious neurological deficits or motor weakness in his extremities. By March 7, 2000, decreased strength of the claimant’s left leg in the seated position was noted. On September 1, 2000, the claimant’s right leg was noted to have some weakness.
The claimant stated that prior to __________, any pain or weakness in his legs had not caused him to fall. He said that on that date, while at home, he arose from his chair and fell as he moved toward the bathroom. He said he fell onto his buttocks. As a result, he herniated his L3-4 disc and has since had surgery for that condition.
The definition of “injury” includes “a disease or infection naturally resulting from the damage or harm.” Section 401.011(26). Because the injury of __________, was in the same general region where the compensable injury occurred, the lumbar spine, we do not necessarily agree that Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 950524, decided May 19, 1995, cited by the hearing officer, is directly on point because that decision involved injuries to entirely new and different body parts, even though the injuries were alleged to have resulted from an intervening accident that was arguably brought about by a weakened state from the original injury.
While we acknowledge that the weakened state of his legs was the claimant’s theory of recovery, the case more nearly applicable is Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 990644, decided May 12, 1999, which held compensable a home-related accident that caused further injury to the compensably injured region. In this case, if a weakening at the L3-4 level was shown to have resulted naturally from the claimant’s original compensable injury and necessary medical treatment, then a worsening of that disc level, through activities of daily living, could be causally connected to the original injury.
We have, therefore, carefully reviewed the medical evidence in this case for any indication that the L3-4 disc deteriorated as a natural result of the compensable injury and fusion done for the L4-5 disc. We have found none.
We will uphold the hearing officer’s judgment if it can be sustained on any reasonable basis supported by the evidence. Daylin, Inc. v. Juarez, 766 S.W.2d 347, 352 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1989, writ denied); Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 950791, decided July 3, 1995. Accordingly, the hearing officer’s decision and order are not so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be manifestly unfair or unjust and are affirmed. Atlantic Mutual Insurance Company v. Middleman, 661 S.W.2d 182 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1983, writ ref’d n.r.e.).
The true corporate name of the insurance carrier is (SELF-INSURED) and the name and address of its registered agent for service of process is
SUPERINTENDENT
ADDRESS
CITY, ZIP CODE.
Susan M. Kelley – Appeals Judge
CONCUR:
Elaine M. Chaney – Appeals Judge
Robert W. Potts – Appeals Judge