This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 et seq. (1989 Act). A contested case hearing was held on October 31, 2001. The hearing officer found that the claimant sustained a lumbar strain injury and had disability only for the time period from _________[1] through July 1, 2001. The claimant has appealed, questioning the factual basis for the hearing officer’s belief that the claimant was released to work effective July 2, and pointing out that medical evidence is not required to prove disability. The carrier responds that the decision should be affirmed.
DECISION
We affirm the hearing officer’s decision.
The claimant fell a small distance from a ladder on ____________; she twisted as she fell, and was taken to emergency treatment. A medical slip dated ________ also took the claimant off work for three days. The diagnosis was lumbar sprain. As the hearing officer noted, a medical center record in evidence shows that at a June 27 visit, the claimant was taken off work until July 2, 2001. An MRI showed mild degenerative disease with dessication at L5-S1, and an otherwise normal lumbar spine. The claimant was discharged for behavior set out and admitted in a transcribed interview with the employer’s loss prevention agent on July 2, 2001. The claimant admitted taking things from her employer but indicated it was a widespread practice.
A trier of fact is not required to accept a claimant’s testimony at face value, even if not specifically contradicted by other evidence. Bullard v. Universal Underwriters Insurance Company, 609 S.W.2d 621 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1980, no writ). Conflicts in the evidence were the responsibility of the hearing officer to judge, considering the demeanor of the witnesses and the record as a whole. An appeals-level body is not a fact finder and does not normally pass upon the credibility of witnesses or substitute its own judgment for that of the trier of fact, even if the evidence would support a different result. National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania v. Soto, 819 S.W.2d 619, 620 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1991, writ denied); American Motorists Insurance Co. v. Volentine, 867 S.W.2d 170 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1993, no writ). The decision of the hearing officer is sufficiently supported on all three matters in which she decided that the evidence weighed against the claimant.
While we agree that medical evidence is not required to prove disability, it is evidence that may be relied upon by the trier of fact. In this case, the hearing officer could choose to disbelieve the claimant’s assertion that she was unable to work due to her back.
The decision of the hearing officer will be set aside only if the evidence supporting the hearing officer’s determination is so weak or against the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong or manifestly unjust. Atlantic Mutual Insurance Company v. Middleman, 661 S.W.2d 182 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1983, writ ref’d n.r.e.). We cannot agree that this is the case here, and affirm the decision and order.
The true corporate name of the insurance carrier is THE TRAVELERS INDEMNITY COMPANY OF AMERICA and the name and address of its registered agent for service of process is
C.T. CORPORATION SYSTEM
350 NORTH ST. PAUL STREET
DALLAS, TEXAS 75201.
Susan M. Kelley – Appeals Judge
CONCUR:
Judy L. S. Barnes – Appeals Judge
Thomas A. Knapp – Appeals Judge
- The date was clerically corrected after initially being written in the findings of fact and conclusions of law as _________. ↑