This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 et seq. (1989 Act). A decision was issued after remand in Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 010902, decided June 6, 2001, with no additional contested case hearing (CCH) being held. The hearing officer held that the first impairment rating (IR) assigned to the respondent (claimant) had not become final, and that the issue of IR was not ripe for determination because appointment of a second designated doctor would be required to conduct a new examination of the claimant because the claimant had moved to another state.
The appellant (self-insured) has only appealed that portion of the hearing officer’s decision that finds that the first IR did not become final. The self-insured once more attached documents to its appeal that are not contained in the record of the CCH, arguing that these rebut the statement made in the first Appeals Panel decision that the hearing officer did not have before her the self-insured’s arguments that the claimant was untruthful to the adjuster in conversations held after the CCH. There is no response from the claimant.
DECISION
We affirm the hearing officer’s decision.
Although the self-insured asks that the CCH be reconvened by order of the Appeals Panel, the Appeals Panel may remand a case only once. Section 410.203(c). We are without authority to grant this requested relief.
The hearing officer did not err in deciding that the claimant’s original certification of IR issued September 22, 1999, did not become final under Tex. W.C. Comm’n 28 TEX. ADMIN. Code Section 130.5 (Rule 130.5). Evidence introduced at the hearing, including the written dispute filed by the claimant’s treating doctor and the testimony of both the claimant and the treating doctor, supports the hearing officer’s determination that the September 22, 1999, certification was timely disputed by the treating doctor, acting on behalf of the claimant. As we previously observed in affirming this holding of the hearing officer, the parties presented evidence that genuinely conflicts on the issue of whether the first certification and IR became final pursuant to Rule 130.5. Pursuant to Section 410.165(a), the hearing officer is the sole judge of the weight and credibility of the evidence. The hearing officer resolves the conflicts and inconsistencies in the evidence and determines what facts have been established from the conflicting evidence. Garza v. Commercial Insurance Company of Newark, New Jersey, 508 S.W.2d 701 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, no writ); St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Company v. Escalera, 385 S.W.2d 477 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1964, writ ref’d n.r.e.).
With respect to the newly attached documents, the Appeals Panel once again finds itself in the posture of assessing documents that were not included in the record of the case. The primary point in arguing the relevance of these is that such statements would affect assessment of the claimant’s credibility. The self-insured argues that the issue of misstatements by the claimant post-CCH was actually before the hearing officer in the form of an April 17, 2001, response to Hearing Officer’s exhibit No. 2 and a request to reconvene the CCH. However, the original decision of the hearing officer had already been issued, on April 9, 2001. (The adjuster’s notes alleged to show the claimant’s untruthfulness are dated February 28, 2001, and it is not clear from the record or even the attachments to the appeals why it was not until after the hearing officer’s decision was issued that she was asked to consider these notes).
As we observed before, it is not obvious to the Appeals Panel that such uncredited statements in the submitted entries, even if properly before the hearing officer, were so material that the outcome of the decision would change. The decision of the hearing officer will be set aside only if the evidence supporting the hearing officer’s determination is so weak or against the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong or manifestly unjust. Atlantic Mutual Insurance Company v. Middleman, 661 S.W.2d 182 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1983, writ ref’d n.r.e.). We do not agree that this is the case here, and affirm the decision and order.
The true corporate name of the insurance carrier (a certified self-insured) is __________ and the name and address of its registered agent for service of process is
JOAN TASKER
2000 WEST MARSHALL DRIVE
GRAND PRAIRIE, TEXAS 75051.
Susan M. Kelley
CONCUR:
Judy L. S. Barnes – Appeals Judge
Gary L. Kilgore – Appeals Judge