This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 et seq. (1989 Act). A contested case hearing was held on October 25, 2001. The hearing officer resolved the disputed issues before him by determining that (1) respondent (claimant) was in the course and scope of his employment on _______________, when he was involved in a motor vehicle accident (MVA); (2) claimant sustained a compensable back injury on _______________; (3) claimant did not have disability; and (4) appellant (carrier) did not waive the right to dispute compensability of the claimed injury of _______________. Carrier appealed the determination that claimant was in the course and scope of his employment at the time of the MVA, asserting that claimant was not within the course and scope of his employment, so the injury is not compensable. There is no response from claimant in the file. The hearing officer’s determinations that claimant did not have disability and that carrier did not waive its right to dispute compensability of the claimed injury of _______________, are not appealed and have, therefore, become final. Section 410.169.
DECISION
We affirm.
The hearing officer found the following relevant facts: (1) on _______________, claimant worked as an investigator for the employer law firm; (2) the employer furnished an automobile to claimant for use in the performance of his work; (3) claimant attended the employer’s holiday luncheon on _______________, from approximately 2:00 to 3:30 p.m. or as late as 4:30 p.m.; (4) after claimant left his luncheon, his supervisor allowed him to go home; (5) claimant was also directed by his supervisor to use the employer-furnished automobile and return briefly to the employer’s office at 5:00 p.m. on _______________, to forward the telephone to the answering service; (6) on his way from home to the office to forward the telephones, at approximately 5:00 p.m. on _______________, claimant was involved in an MVA while driving the employer-furnished automobile; (7) claimant did not deviate from his employment when he went home because the employer specifically authorized him to go home; (8) claimant was engaged in the furtherance of his employer’s business and was acting as directed by the employer at the time of the MVA; and (9) the MVA of _______________, caused an injury to claimant’s back.
On appeal, carrier asserts that even if the employer instructed claimant to return to the employer’s office briefly to forward the phones, claimant deviated from those instructions by first going home, even if he had permission to do so. Carrier asserts that claimant falls under the “coming and going” rule because he was merely traveling to work.
The general rule is that an injury occurring in the use of the public streets or highways in going to and returning from the place of employment is not compensable. American General Insurance Co. v. Coleman, 157 Tex. 377, 303 S.W.2d 370 (Tex. 1957). The rule is known as the “coming and going” rule. The rationale of the rule is that “in most instances such an injury is suffered as a consequence of risks and hazards to which all members of the traveling public are subject rather than risks and hazards having to do with and originating in the work or business of the employer.” Texas General Indemnity Co. v. Bottom, 365 S.W.2d 350, 353 (Tex. 1963). The exception to the coming and going rule where the employee has been directed in the employee’s employment to proceed from one place to another place has been referred to as the “special mission” exception. See Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 991507, decided September 7, 1999; Evans v. Illinois Employers Insurance of Wausau, 790 S.W.2d 302 (Tex. 1990).
Regarding our review of the hearing officer’s fact findings, we will not reverse a fact finding unless it is so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be clearly wrong or manifestly unjust. Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986). We review the hearing officer’s decision for the correct application of the law to the facts and we may affirm the hearing officer’s decision on any ground supported by the evidence. See Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 970024, decided February 19, 1997 (Unpublished).
Carrier asserts that the hearing officer rejected the special mission exception and asserts that, because claimant did not appeal that determination, it has become final. We disagree. We note that the hearing officer did not make a specific determination rejecting the special mission exception. In any case, an appellate-level body has an obligation to ensure that the law is properly applied to the facts of the case. The special mission exception involves the application of the law to the facts found by the hearing officer. In the case before us, the hearing officer found that claimant was directed to make a brief trip to the employer’s office in addition to his usual “coming and going” travel to and from work. The facts of this case are similar to those in Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 951833, decided December 18, 1995. See also Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 981612, decided August 31, 1998 (Unpublished); Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 000503, decided April 19, 2000. The extra trip to the office that claimant was instructed to take was not for regularly scheduled work. See Appeal No. 951833, supra. Carrier’s contention that claimant was merely returning to work from lunch does not find support in the record or in the hearing officer’s fact findings. Based upon the record before us, we find that claimant was engaged in a “special mission” in furtherance of his employer’s affairs or business at the time of the _______________, MVA, and that he was acting within the course and scope of his employment.
We affirm the hearing officer’s decision and order.
According to information provided by carrier, the true corporate name of the insurance carrier is TEXAS MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY and the name and address of its registered agent for service of process is
MR. RUSSELL R. OLIVER, PRESIDENT
221 WEST 6TH STREET
AUSTIN, TX 78701.
Judy L. S. Barnes – Appeals Judge
CONCUR:
Susan M. Kelley – Appeals Judge
Michael B. McShane – Appeals Judge