This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 et seq. (1989 Act). A contested case hearing was held on October 29, 2001. The hearing officer determined that the appellant (claimant) did not sustain a compensable injury on ___________, and did not have disability. The claimant appeals on sufficiency of the evidence grounds. The claimant asserts also that the questions asked may not have been adequately translated, or his answers adequately interpreted, causing him to be confused about the sequence of events. The respondent (carrier) replies, urging affirmance.
DECISION
Affirmed.
The hearing officer made factual determinations that the claimant was not injured in the course and scope of his employment and that he did not sustain disability. The hearing officer specifically noted that the claimant was a poor historian and his account of the claimed injury and the medical treatment he received was inconsistent within itself and with the other evidence. As to the medical evidence, one doctor opined that the claimant’s claimed epididymitis did not result from a strain at work while a second doctor only said that it was “possible.” The hearing officer did not find credible evidence of a low back injury. The evidence sufficiently supports the determinations. Section 410.165(a) provides that the hearing officer, as finder of fact, is the sole judge of the relevance and materiality of the evidence as well as the weight and credibility that is to be given the evidence. It was for the hearing officer, as trier of fact, to resolve the inconsistencies and conflicts in the evidence. Garza v. Commercial Insurance Company of Newark, New Jersey, 508 S.W.2d 701 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, no writ). This is equally true regarding medical evidence. Texas Employers Insurance Association v. Campos, 666 S.W.2d 286 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ). The trier of fact may believe all, part, or none of the testimony of any witness. Aetna Insurance Company v. English, 204 S.W.2d 850 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1947, no writ). We will reverse a factual determination of a hearing officer only if that determination is so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust. Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986); Pool v. Ford Motor Company, 715 S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tex. 1986). Applying this standard of review to the record of this case, we decline to substitute our opinion of the evidence for that of the hearing officer.
Our review of the record indicates that no objections were made at the hearing to the adequacy of the translation that was being done. While there were a few occasions where the translator asked someone to repeat a question or an answer, this in itself does not raise any question about the adequacy of the translation. Any potential error was waived by the claimant’s failure to object at the time of the translation.
We affirm the decision and order of the hearing officer.
The true corporate name of the insurance carrier is AMERISURE INSURANCE COMPANY and the name and address of its registered agent for service of process is
CINDY GHALIBAF
7610 STEMMONS FREEWAY
DALLAS, TEXAS 75247-4216.
Michael B. McShane – Appeals Judge
CONCUR:
Judy L. S. Barnes – Appeals Judge
Elaine M. Chaney – Appeals Judge