This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 et seq. (1989 Act). A contested case hearing was held on November 6, 2001. The hearing officer resolved the disputed issue by concluding that the deceased employee, JG’s, death by suicide was not a result of the compensable injury sustained on _______________. The appellant (claimant beneficiary) appeals, essentially arguing that the findings and conclusions are against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. The respondent (carrier) replies urging that the fact findings and conclusions asserted as erroneous by the claimant are supported by sufficient evidence.
DECISION
The decision and order of the hearing officer are affirmed.
The parties stipulated that the decedent sustained a compensable injury on _______________, and committed suicide on August 27, 2000. The claimant beneficiary testified that approximately three months prior to his suicide, surgery provided the decedent with substantial relief from his back pain. She additionally testified that both parents of the decedent died in the two years prior to his suicide. The record reflected that the decedent had sustained numerous injuries prior to _______________, including injury to his neck, shoulder, and a prior back injury. The evidence also reflected that the decedent suffered from headaches, night sweats, ringing in his ears, fatigue, and arthritis, which were unrelated to the _______________, compensable injury. A medical record in evidence dated May 5, 1998, reflected that at that time the decedent was already taking medication for depression and that manic depression was discussed with the decedent.
The claimant beneficiary had the burden of proof on the disputed issue. The issue in this case was whether the decedent’s suicide was a result of the compensable injury. Section 401.011(26) defines injury as damage or harm to the physical structure of the body “and a disease . . . naturally resulting from the damage or harm.” In Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 961449, decided September 9, 1996, we addressed the “proper standard” for determining whether a claimant’s psychological condition is the result of a physical compensable injury. There, we cited Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 950749, decided June 21, 1995, for the proposition that although a psychological problem may not have arisen “but for” the physical injury, that alone is not sufficient to establish the compensability of the psychological condition. Rather, we quoted Texas Employers Insurance Association v. Wilson, 522 S.W.2d 192, 195 (Tex. 1975) as follows:
[i]t therefore must be concluded that although the claimant may be disabled by reason of a neurosis traceable in part to circumstances arising out of and immediately following his injury, there must be a finding that the neurosis was the result of the injury. [Emphasis in the original.]
We are satisfied that the challenged findings are not so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be clearly wrong or manifestly unjust. Pool v. Ford Motor Company, 715 S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tex. 1986); In re King’s Estate, 150 Tex. 662, 244 S.W.2d 660 (1951).
The carrier argues in its response that a claimant must establish a derangement of the deceased’s mind at the time of suicide such that the intentional act no longer becomes intentional to overcome the intentional act prohibitions of Section 406.032. However, the determinations of the hearing officer are affirmed for the reasons set forth above and this issue will not be addressed.
The true corporate name of the insurance carrier is SERVICE LLOYDS INSURANCE COMPANY and the name and address of its registered agent for service of process is:
JOSEPH KELLY GRAY
6904 CAPITOL OF TEXAS HWY NORTH
AUSTIN, TEXAS 78755-0850.
Gary L. Kilgore – Appeals Judge
CONCUR:
Elaine M. Chaney – Appeals Judge
Susan M. Kelley – Appeals Judge