This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 et seq. (1989 Act). A contested case hearing was held on November 13, 2001. The hearing officer resolved the disputed issue before him by determining that the appellant (claimant) did not sustain an injury to the left wrist, diagnosed as carpal tunnel syndrome (CTS), and to the left elbow, diagnosed as left cubital tunnel syndrome, in addition to the injury to her left shoulder and neck on ______________, or on any other relevant date. Claimant appealed, asserting that the hearing officer’s determination is against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. The respondent self-insured (carrier herein) responded that the Appeals Panel should affirm the hearing officer’s decision and order.
DECISION
We affirm.
Claimant testified that: (1) she sustained a compensable injury on ______________, when she slipped on a wet floor and fell, landing on her left side; (2) she experienced left elbow and left wrist pain almost immediately; and (3) she first sought medical treatment on ______________ Carrier’s Payment of Compensation or Notice of Refused/Disputed Claim (TWCC-21) dated November 24, 1999, indicated that it accepted a “left side of body/arm/shoulder/back/cervical injury.” Carrier’s TWCC-21 dated June 1, 2000, indicated that it disputed compensability of both the cervical spine injury and the left hand CTS condition. At issue in this appeal is whether the hearing officer erred in his determination that claimant’s ______________, compensable injury does not extend to and include CTS in her left wrist and cubital tunnel syndrome in her left elbow.
We have reviewed the complained-of determination regarding extent of injury and conclude that the issue involved a fact question for the hearing officer. The hearing officer reviewed the record and decided what facts were established. We conclude that the hearing officer’s determination is not so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be clearly wrong or manifestly unjust. Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986).
We affirm the hearing officer’s decision and order.
According to information provided by carrier, the true corporate name of the insurance carrier is (a self-insured governmental entity) and the name and address of its registered agent for service of process is
CH
(ADDRESS)
(CITY), TEXAS (ZIP CODE).
Judy L. S. Barnes
CONCUR:
Elaine M. Chaney – Appeals Judge
Thomas A. Knapp – Appeals Judge