This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 et seq. (1989 Act). A contested case hearing (CCH) was held on April 2, 2001, with the record closing on July 17, 2001. The hearing officer determined that the respondent (claimant) did sustain a new compensable injury on _______________, and that she had disability as a result of her compensable injury from January 27, 2001, through the date of the CCH, July 17, 2001. The appellant (self-insured) appealed on sufficiency of the evidence grounds. The claimant did not submit a response to the appeal. In Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 011879, decided October 1, 2001, the Appeals Panel remanded the case to the hearing officer to obtain from the self-insured the correct registered agent information, as required by Section 410.164(c). The required information was obtained on remand. In the decision on remand, the hearing officer made the same determinations as she had in the original decision. The self-insured has again appealed. No response was submitted by the claimant.
DECISION
Affirmed.
The evidence sufficiently supports the hearing officer’s determinations that the claimant sustained a compensable injury on _______________, and had disability from January 27, 2001, through the date of the CCH. Section 401.011(10) provides that a compensable injury is an injury which arises out of and in the course and scope of employment for which compensation is payable. Section 401.011(16) provides that disability is the inability because of a compensable injury to obtain and retain employment at wages equivalent to the preinjury wage. The hearing officer was persuaded by the claimant’s testimony and the medical records in evidence that the claimant sustained a new work-related injury on _______________, as she claimed, and the evidence shows that the claimant was off work because of the injury.
The hearing officer, as finder of fact, is the sole judge of the relevance and materiality of the evidence as well as the weight and credibility that is to be given the evidence. Section 410.165(a). It was for the hearing officer, as trier of fact, to resolve the inconsistencies and conflicts in the evidence. Garza v. Commercial Insurance Company of Newark, New Jersey, 508 S.W.2d 701 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, no writ). This is equally true regarding medical evidence. Texas Employers Insurance Association v. Campos, 666 S.W.2d 286 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ). We will reverse a factual determination of a hearing officer only if that determination is so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and manifestly unjust. Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986); Pool v. Ford Motor Company, 715 S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tex. 1986). Applying this standard of review to the record of this case, we decline to substitute our opinion of the evidence for that of the hearing officer.
The decision and order of the hearing officer are affirmed.
The true corporate name of the insurance carrier is (a self-insured governmental entity) and the name and address of its registered agent for service of process is
SUPERINTENDENT
(ADDRESS)
(CITY), TEXAS (ZIP CODE).
Michael B. McShane – Appeals Judge
CONCUR:
Judy L. S. Barnes – Appeals Judge
Elaine M. Chaney – Appeals Judge