This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 et seq. (1989 Act). A contested case hearing was held on October 25, 2001. With respect to the single issue before her, the hearing officer determined that the appellant’s (claimant) compensable injury of ______________, does not extend to or include a cervical spine injury. In her appeal, the claimant essentially argues that the hearing officer’s extent-of-injury determination is against the great weight of the evidence. In its response to the claimant’s appeal, the respondent (carrier) urges affirmance.
DECISION
Affirmed.
The parties stipulated that the claimant sustained a compensable injury on______________, to her lumbar spine, right knee, and right shoulder, when she fell off a three-step ladder at work. The issue of whether the claimant’s compensable injury extended to or included a cervical spine injury was a question of fact for the hearing officer. The hearing officer is the sole judge of the relevance and materiality of the evidence and of its weight and credibility. Section 410.165(a). The hearing officer resolves conflicts and inconsistencies in the evidence and decides what facts the evidence has established. Texas Employers Ins. Ass’n v. Campos, 666 S.W.2d 286 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ). Generally, injury and disability may be proven by the testimony of the claimant alone, if it is believed by the hearing officer. Gee v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 765 S.W.2d 394 (Tex. 1989). When reviewing a hearing officer’s factual determination, we will reverse such determination only if it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong or manifestly unjust. Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986); Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tex. 1986).
The hearing officer was acting within her province as the fact finder in determining that the claimant did not sustain her burden of proving that her compensable injury included a cervical injury. Our review of the record does not demonstrate that the challenged determination is so contrary to the great weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong or manifestly unjust. Therefore, no sound basis exists for us to reverse the extent-of-injury determination on appeal. Cain; Pool.
The hearing officer’s decision and order are affirmed.
The true corporate name of the insurance carrier is FREMONT COMPENSATION INSURANCE COMPANY and the name and address of its registered agent for service of process is
CT CORPORATION SYSTEM
350 NORTH ST. PAUL STREET
DALLAS, TEXAS 75201.
Elaine M. Chaney – Appeals Judge
CONCUR:
Judy L. S. Barnes – Appeals Judge
Thomas A. Knapp – Appeals Judge