This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 et seq. (1989 Act). A contested case hearing was held on November 1, 2001. The hearing officer determined that the appellant (claimant) did not sustain a compensable injury in the course and scope of his employment on ____________, and that the claimant does not have disability as a result of the alleged injury of ____________. The claimant appealed arguing that the hearing officer’s determinations are against the great weight of the evidence and incorrect as a matter of fact and as a matter of law. The respondent (carrier) filed a response urging affirmance.
DECISION
Affirmed.
The claimant testified that his job duties included washing and drying clothes, towels, and mop heads. The claimant and his supervisor testified that the claimant was reprimanded for attendance and tardiness violations on ____________. The claimant testified that he was injured at work on ____________, when he lifted a laundry bag and he felt a pop to his back. A doctor for the employer diagnosed the claimant with a lumbar strain/sprain on ____________, and released the claimant to light duty work on August 25, 2001, but the claimant did not return. The parties agreed in their testimony that the claimant received a bona fide offer of employment of light duty on August 31, 2001, but he did not return to work after his alleged injury. The evidence on many points was in direct conflict.
The claimant argues on appeal that the hearing officer’s Statement of Evidence and two fact findings are inaccurate. However, we have reviewed the evidence and testimony and find that the hearing officer’s determinations have sufficient support in the evidence.
The hearing officer did not err in finding that there was no compensable injury or disability. The hearing officer further found that the claimant retained an ability to obtain and retain employment equivalent to his preinjury average weekly wage, which would preclude a finding of disability even if an injury were determined favorably to the claimant. It is the hearing officer, as the sole judge of the weight and credibility of the evidence (Section 410.165(a)), who resolves the conflicts and inconsistencies in the evidence (Garza v. Commercial Insurance Company of Newark, New Jersey, 508 S.W.2d 701 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, no writ)), and determines what facts have been established from the conflicting evidence. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Company v. Escalera, 385 S.W.2d 477 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1964, writ ref’d n.r.e.). This is equally true of medical evidence. Texas Employers Insurance Association v. Campos, 666 S.W.2d 286 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ). The hearing officer evidently did not believe the testimony of the claimant. The Appeals Panel will not disturb the challenged factual findings of a hearing officer unless they are so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be clearly wrong or manifestly unjust and we do not find them so in this case. Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986); In re King’s Estate, 150 Tex. 662, 244 S.W.2d 660 (1951). The decision and order of the hearing officer are affirmed.
The true corporate name of the insurance carrier is AMERICAN MANUFACTURERS MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY and the name and address of its registered agent for service of process is
CORPORATION SERVCIE COMPANY
800 BRAZOS
AUSTIN, TEXAS 78701.
Susan M. Kelley – Appeals Judge
CONCUR:
Chris Cowan – Appeals Judge
Thomas A. Knapp – Appeals Judge