This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 et seq. (1989 Act). A contested case hearing was held on March 8, 2001. The hearing was reconvened on November 7, 2001, and the record closed on that day. With respect to the issues before her, the hearing officer determined that the respondent (claimant) sustained a compensable injury in the form of an occupational disease on ____________; that the claimant timely reported her injury to her employer; and that the claimant had disability as a result of her compensable injury from June 3, 2000, through the date of the hearing. The appellant (carrier) appeals the determinations on sufficiency grounds. The claimant responds urging affirmance.
DECISION
Affirmed.
The claimant had the burden to prove that she suffered damage or harm to the physical structure of the body occurring as a result of repetitious, physically traumatic activities that occurred over time and arose out of an in the course and scope of her employment. See Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 992486, decided December 29, 1999; Sections 401.011(34) and (36). There was conflicting evidence presented with regard to this issue. The hearing officer is the sole judge of the weight and credibility of the evidence. Section 410.165(a). As the trier of fact, the hearing officer resolves the conflicts and inconsistencies in the evidence and decides what facts the evidence has established. Texas Employers Ins. Ass’n v. Campos, 666 S.W.2d 286 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ. The evidence established that the claimant worked 8 to 12 hours per day; that she assembled between 1000 and 1500 parts per day; and that she had to exert pressure in order to get the pieces to fit together during assembly. That evidence with regard to the mechanism of injury in conjunction with the evidence from the claimant’s treating doctors attributing the claimant’s carpal tunnel syndrome and cervical radiculopathy to the repetitively traumatic hand motions she was required to perform at work provide sufficient evidentiary support for the hearing officer’s determination that the claimant sustained a compensable injury. Our review of the record does not reveal that the injury determination is so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be clearly wrong or manifestly unjust. As such, no sound basis exists for us to reverse that determination on appeal. Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986).
There is also sufficient evidence to support the hearing officer’s determination that the claimant gave notice of the claimed injury to her employer within 30 days of the date she knew or should have known of her injury. Section 408.007 provides that the date of injury for an occupational disease is the date on which the employee knew or should have known that the disease may be related to the employment. We have said that the date of injury is the date when the injured employee, as a reasonable person, could have been expected to understand the nature, seriousness, and work-related nature of the disease. Texas Workers’ Compensation Appeal No. 94534, decided June 13, 1994, citing Commercial Ins. Co. v. Smith, 596 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1980, writ ref’d n.r.e.). The hearing officer was acting within her province as the fact finder in crediting the claimant’ testimony that she did not realize that she had a work-related injury until ____________, and that she reported her injury to her employer on that date. Nothing in our review of the record demonstrates that the hearing officer’s notice determination is so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to compel its reversal on appeal. Cain, supra.
The hearing officer did not err in determining that the claimant had disability from June 3, 2000, through the date of the hearing. The claimant’s testimony and the evidence from the claimant’s treating doctors support the disability determination and that determination is not so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be clearly wrong or manifestly unjust. Cain, supra.
The decision and order of the hearing officer are affirmed.
The true corporate name of the insurance carrier is CONNECTICUT INDEMNITY COMPANY and the name and address of its registered agent for service of process is
CORPORATION SERVICES COMPANY
800 BRAZOS
AUSTIN, TEXAS 78701
Elaine M. Chaney – Appeals Judge
CONCUR:
Susan M. Kelley – Appeals Judge
Terri Kay Oliver – Appeals Judge