This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 et seq. (1989 Act). A contested case hearing was held on November 29, 2001. The hearing officer resolved the disputed issue by determining that the appellant (claimant) did not sustain a compensable injury on _______________, and that the claimant had no disability from a compensable injury. The claimant appealed the hearing officer’s determinations on sufficiency grounds and the respondent (carrier) responds, urging affirmance.
DECISION
Affirmed.
The claimant testified that he had sustained a wrist injury when he dropped some aluminum studs while working for the employer on _______________; that he reported the injury that same day to his leadman; and that he was not able to work from August 10, 2001, through October 14, 2001, because of the injury. The carrier presented evidence to support the assertion that the claimant had no work-related injury or disability and that the claimant had a previous injury to his wrist that he did not voluntarily disclose.
The hearing officer made findings of fact and concluded that the claimant did not sustain a compensable injury on _______________. The claimant had the burden to prove that he was injured in the course and scope of his employment. There is conflicting evidence in this case. The 1989 Act makes the hearing officer the sole judge of the weight and credibility to be given to the evidence. Section 410.165(a). As the trier of fact, the hearing officer may believe all, part, or none of the testimony of any witness. Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 950084, decided February 28, 1995. The finder of fact may believe that the claimant has an injury, but disbelieve the claimant’s testimony that the injury occurred at work as claimed. Johnson v. Employers Reinsurance Corporation, 351 S.W.2d 936 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1961, no writ). A fact finder is not bound by the testimony (or evidence) of a medical witness where the credibility of that testimony (or evidence) is manifestly dependent upon the credibility of the information imparted to the medical witness by the claimant. Rowland v. Standard Fire Insurance Company, 489 S.W.2d 151 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1972, writ ref’d n.r.e.). An appellate-level body is not a fact finder and does not normally pass upon the credibility of witnesses or substitute its judgment for that of the trier of fact, even if the evidence would support a different result. When reviewing a hearing officer’s decision to determine the factual sufficiency of the evidence, we should set aside the decision only if it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust. Appeal No. 950084, supra. We conclude that the hearing officer’s findings, conclusions, and decision are supported by sufficient evidence and that they are not so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust. Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986).
Given our affirmance of the hearing officer’s determination that the claimant did not sustain a compensable injury, we likewise affirm his determination that the claimant did not have disability. By definition, the existence of a compensable injury is a prerequisite to a finding of disability. Section 401.011(16).
The hearing officer’s decision and order are affirmed.
The true corporate name of the insurance carrier is ST. PAUL MERCURY INSURANCE COMPANY and the name and address of its registered agent for service of process is
CORPORATION SERVICE COMPANY
800 BRAZOS
AUSTIN, TEXAS 78701.
Michael B. McShane – Appeals Judge
CONCUR:
Robert W. Potts – Appeals Judge
Edward Vilano – Appeals Judge