Title: 

APD 020238

Significant Decision

Date: 

March 18, 2002

Issues: 

Disabilty/Existence-Duration, Timely Reporting to Employer

Table of Contents

APD 020238

This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 et seq. (1989 Act). A contested case hearing was held on January 8, 2002. The hearing officer resolved the disputed issues before him by determining that the appellant (claimant) did not sustain a compensable repetitive trauma injury or otherwise on ____________, and that she did not have disability. The claimant appealed on sufficiency grounds. The respondent (carrier) responded, urging affirmance.

DECISION

We affirm.

The claimant testified that she sustained a compensable repetitive trauma injury to her neck, back, and shoulder on ____________, and that she has been unable to return to work due to her injuries as of the date of the hearing. In support of her position that she sustained a compensable injury and has had disability, the claimant introduced medical records which indicate that her injuries could have been caused by her work. The carrier presented evidence that the job the claimant was doing at the time of the claimed injury was classified as light duty, and that she had only been doing the job for about an hour when she first complained of discomfort.

The 1989 Act makes the hearing officer the sole judge of the weight and credibility to be given to the evidence. Section 410.165(a). As the trier of fact, the hearing officer resolves conflicts and inconsistencies in the evidence and may believe all, part, or none of the testimony of any witness. Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 950084, decided February 28, 1995. The finder of fact may believe that the claimant has an injury, but disbelieve that the claimant’s injury occurred at work as claimed. Johnson v. Employers Reinsurance Corporation, 351 S.W.2d 936 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1961, no writ). A fact finder is not bound by the testimony (or evidence) of a medical witness where the credibility of that testimony (or evidence) is manifestly dependent upon the credibility of the information imparted to the medical witness by the claimant. Rowland v. Standard Fire Insurance Company, 489 S.W.2d 151 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1972, writ ref’d n.r.e.). The Appeals Panel will not disturb the challenged factual findings of a hearing officer unless they are so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be clearly wrong or manifestly unjust and we do not find them so in this case. Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986); In re King’s Estate, 150 Tex. 662, 244 S.W.2d 660 (1951). Although another fact finder could have reached a different conclusion on the same evidence, that alone is not a basis on which to disturb the hearing officer’s decision. Salazar, et al. v. Hill, 551 S.W.2d 518 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1977, writ ref’d n.r.e.).

The hearing officer’s decision and order are affirmed.

The true corporate name of the insurance carrier is AMERICAN CASUALTY COMPANY OF READING, PENNSYLVANIA and the name and address of its registered agent for service of process is

CT CORPORATION SYSTEM

350 NORTH ST. PAUL

DALLAS, TEXAS 75201.

Gary L. Kilgore – Appeals Judge

CONCUR:

Chris Cowan – Appeals Judge

Susan M. Kelley – Appeals Judge