This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 et seq. (1989 Act). A contested case hearing was held on January 17, 2002. The hearing officer determined that the appellant (claimant) had mild carpal tunnel syndrome in his right wrist as a result of a motor vehicle accident on ____________, but that it did not include de Quervain’s tenosynovitis. She further held that the claimant was not unable to obtain and retain employment equivalent to his preinjury average weekly wage due to the compensable injury (i.e., he did not have “disability” as defined in Section 401.011(16)) after August 16, 2001.
The claimant has appealed the extent-of-injury and disability determinations as against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. The carrier responds that the determinations have support in the record.
DECISION
We affirm the hearing officer’s decision.
Essentially, the claimant quarrels with the manner in which the hearing officer gave weight and credibility to the evidence. The hearing officer is the sole judge of the relevance, materiality, weight, and credibility of the evidence presented at the hearing. Section 410.165(a). The decision should not be set aside because different inferences and conclusions may be drawn upon review, even when the record contains evidence that would lend itself to different inferences. Garza v. Commercial Insurance Company of Newark, New Jersey, 508 S.W.2d 701 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, no writ). An appeals-level body is not a fact finder and does not normally pass upon the credibility of witnesses or substitute its own judgment for that of the trier of fact, even if the evidence would support a different result. National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania v. Soto, 819 S.W.2d 619, 620 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1991, writ denied); American Motorists Insurance Co. v. Volentine, 867 S.W.2d 170 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1993, no writ). The Appeals Panel has held that a fact finder is not bound by the testimony of a medical witness when the credibility of the testimony is manifestly dependent on the credibility of the information imparted to the witness by the claimant. Rowland v. Standard Fire Insurance Company, 489 S.W.2d 151 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1972, writ ref’d n.r.e.).
The record in this case presented conflicting evidence for the hearing officer to resolve. In considering all the evidence in the record, we cannot agree that the findings of the hearing officer are so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be manifestly wrong and unjust. In re King’s Estate, 150 Tex. 662, 244 S.W.2d 660 (1951). We therefore affirm the decision and order.
The true corporate name of the insurance carrier is INDIANA LUMBERMENS MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY and the name and address of its registered agent for service of process is
EDDIE STAFFORD
1417 WEST MAIN, SUITE 104
CARROLLTON, TEXAS 75006.
Susan M. Kelley – Appeals Judge
CONCUR:
Michael B. McShane – Appeals Judge
Edward Vilano – Appeals Judge