Title: 

APD 022573

Significant Decision

Date: 

November 21, 2002

Issues: 

Extent of Injury

Table of Contents

APD 022573

This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 et seq. (1989 Act). A contested case hearing was held on September 26, 2002. The hearing officer resolved the disputed issue by deciding that the ___________, compensable injury does not extend to and include the cervical spine and thoracic spine in addition to the left shoulder/arm. The appellant (claimant) appeals, arguing that there is no evidence to support the decision of the hearing officer or alternatively, that such decision is so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be manifestly unjust. The respondent (self-insured) responded, urging affirmance.

DECISION

Affirmed.

Extent of injury is a question of fact for the hearing officer. Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 93613, decided August 24, 1993. There was conflicting evidence on the disputed issue. Section 410.165(a) provides that the hearing officer, as finder of fact, is the sole judge of the relevance and materiality of the evidence. It was for the hearing officer, as trier of fact, to resolve the inconsistencies and conflicts in the evidence and determine what facts have been established. Garza v. Commercial Insurance Company of Newark, New Jersey, 508 S.W.2d 701 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, no writ). This is equally true regarding medical evidence. Texas Employers Insurance Association v. Campos, 666 S.W.2d 286 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ). The trier of fact may believe all, part, or none of the testimony of any witness. Aetna Insurance Company v. English, 204 S.W.2d 850 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1947, no writ). We will reverse a factual determination of a hearing officer only if that determination is so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust. Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986); Pool v. Ford Motor Company, 715 S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tex. 1986). Applying this standard of review to the record of this case, we decline to substitute our opinion for that of the hearing officer.

We affirm the decision and order of the hearing officer.

The true corporate name of the insurance carrier is (a certified self-insured) and the name and address of its registered agent for service of process is

JM

(ADDRESS)

(CITY), TEXAS (ZIP CODE).

Margaret L. Turner

CONCUR:

Susan M. Kelley – Appeals Judge

Gary L. Kilgore – Appeals Judge