This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 et seq. (1989 Act). A contested case hearing was held on October 18, 2002. The hearing officer determined that the appellant (claimant herein) did not sustain disability from March 23 through July 16, 2002. The claimant appeals, contending that the hearing officer’s decision is contrary to the evidence and that the employer would not permit the claimant, who had been placed in a cast, to return to work. The respondent (carrier herein) replies that the decision of the hearing officer is supported by the evidence.
DECISION
Finding sufficient evidence to support the decision of the hearing officer and no reversible error in the record, we affirm the decision and order of the hearing officer.
Disability is a question of fact to be determined by the hearing officer. Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 93560, decided August 19, 1993. Section 410.165(a) provides that the contested case hearing officer, as finder of fact, is the sole judge of the relevance and materiality of the evidence as well as of the weight and credibility that is to be given the evidence. It was for the hearing officer, as trier of fact, to resolve the inconsistencies and conflicts in the evidence. Garza v. Commercial Insurance Company of Newark, New Jersey, 508 S.W.2d 701, 702 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, no writ). This is equally true regarding medical evidence. Texas Employers Insurance Association v. Campos, 666 S.W.2d 286, 290 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ). The trier of fact may believe all, part, or none of the testimony of any witness. Taylor v. Lewis, 553 S.W.2d 153, 161 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1977, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Aetna Insurance Co. v. English, 204 S.W.2d 850 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1947, no writ). An appeals-level body is not a fact finder and does not normally pass upon the credibility of witnesses or substitute its own judgment for that of the trier of fact, even if the evidence would support a different result. National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania v. Soto, 819 S.W.2d 619, 620 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1991, writ denied). When reviewing a hearing officer’s decision for factual sufficiency of the evidence we should reverse such decision only if it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust. Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986); Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tex. 1986).
There was conflicting evidence concerning disability in this case. Disability can be established by a claimant’s testimony alone, even if contradictory of medical testimony. Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 92285, decided August 14, 1992; Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 92167, decided June 11, 1992. However, the hearing officer was not required to base her decision on the testimony of the claimant and there was medical evidence which indicated that the claimant could return to work. As far as the cast on the claimant’s left arm was concerned, the claimant’s own testimony indicated that the cast had been removed prior to the period during which disability was being considered in the present case. Under these circumstances, we find no error as a matter of law in the decision of the hearing officer. This is so even though another fact finder might have drawn other inferences and reached other conclusions. Salazar v. Hill, 551 S.W.2d 518 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1977, writ ref’d n.r.e.).
The decision and order of the hearing officer are affirmed.
The true corporate name of the insurance carrier is AMERICAN CASUALTY COMPANY OF READING, PENNSYLVANIA and the name and address of its registered agent for service of process is:
CT CORPORATION
350 NORTH ST. PAUL STREET
DALLAS, TEXAS 75201.
Gary L. Kilgore – Appeals Judge
CONCUR:
Elaine M. Chaney – Appeals Judge
Michael B. McShane
Appeals Panel
Manager/Judge