This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 et seq. (1989 Act). A contested case hearing (CCH) was held on June 27, 2002. The hearing officer determined that the respondent (claimant herein) sustained a compensable injury on ________ and, as result, had disability beginning on ________ and continuing through the date of the CCH. The appellant (carrier herein) contends that the hearing officer’s finding of injury is contrary to the evidence, particularly the medical evidence, which it argues should be controlling on the issue of injury. The claimant responds that the hearing officer’s decision was sufficiently supported by the evidence.
DECISION
Finding sufficient evidence to support the decision of the hearing officer and no reversible error in the record, we affirm the decision and order of the hearing officer.
The question of whether an injury occurred is one of fact. Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 93854, decided November 9, 1993; Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 93449, decided July 21, 1993. Section 410.165(a) provides that the contested case hearing officer, as finder of fact, is the sole judge of the relevance and materiality of the evidence as well as of the weight and credibility that is to be given the evidence. It was for the hearing officer, as trier of fact, to resolve the inconsistencies and conflicts in the evidence. Garza v. Commercial Insurance Company of Newark, New Jersey, 508 S.W.2d 701, 702 (Tex. Civ. App.- Amarillo 1974, no writ). This is equally true regarding medical evidence. Texas Employers Insurance Association v. Campos, 666 S.W.2d 286, 290 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ). The trier of fact may believe all, part, or none of the testimony of any witness. Taylor v. Lewis, 553 S.W.2d 153 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1977, writ ref’d n.r.e.). An appeals-level body is not a fact finder and does not normally pass upon the credibility of witnesses or substitute its own judgment for that of the trier of fact, even if the evidence would support a different result. National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania v. Soto, 819 S.W.2d 619, 620 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1991, writ denied). When reviewing a hearing officer’s decision for factual sufficiency of the evidence we should reverse such decision only if it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust. Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986); Pool v. Ford Motor Company, 715 S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tex. 1986). Applying this standard, we find no basis to overturn the decision of the hearing officer. Generally corroboration of an injury is not required and may be found based upon a claimant’s testimony alone. Gee v. Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Company, 765 S.W.2d 394 (Tex. 1989). Therefore, the claimant’s testimony was sufficient to support the hearing officer’s finding of injury. There was also medical evidence supporting the hearing officer’s finding of injury. To the degree the medical evidence contradicted injury, the hearing officer was free to give that evidence little or no weight.
As the carrier’s attack on the hearing officer’s disability finding is based upon its attack on the hearing officer’s finding of injury, having affirmed the hearing officer’s injury finding we likewise affirm his finding of disability.
The decision and order of the hearing officer are affirmed.
The true corporate name of the insurance carrier is PACIFIC EMPLOYERS INSURANCE COMPANY and the name and address of its registered agent for service of process is:
MARCUS CHARLES MERRITT
6600 CAMPUS CIRCLE DRIVE EAST, SUITE 200
IRVING, TEXAS 75063.
Gary L. Kilgore – Appeals Judge
CONCUR:
Robert W. Potts – Appeals Judge
Margaret L. Turner – Appeals Judge