This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 et seq. (1989 Act). A contested case hearing was held on December 9, 2003. The hearing officer decided that the appellant’s (claimant herein) compensable injury of _____________, did not extend to include the lumbar spine and that the claimant was not entitled to supplemental income benefits (SIBs) for the eighth quarter. The claimant appeals arguing that the evidence did not support these determinations. The respondent (carrier herein) replies that the decision of the hearing officer should be affirmed.
DECISION
Finding sufficient evidence to support the decision of the hearing officer and no reversible error in the record, we affirm the decision and order of the hearing officer.
We have held previously that the extent of injury is a question of fact for the hearing officer. See Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 93613, decided August 24, 1993. Section 410.165(a) provides that the contested case hearing officer, as finder of fact, is the sole judge of the relevance and materiality of the evidence as well as of the weight and credibility that is to be given to the evidence. It was for the hearing officer, as trier of fact, to resolve the inconsistencies and conflicts in the evidence. Garza v. Commercial Insurance Company of Newark, New Jersey, 508 S.W.2d 701, 702 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, no writ). This is equally true regarding medical evidence. Texas Employers Insurance Association v. Campos, 666 S.W.2d 286, 290 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ). The trier of fact may believe all, part, or none of the testimony of any witness. Taylor v. Lewis, 553 S.W.2d 153, 161 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1977, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Aetna Insurance Co. v. English, 204 S.W.2d 850 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1947, no writ). An appeals-level body is not a fact finder and does not normally pass upon the credibility of witnesses or substitute its own judgment for that of the trier of fact, even if the evidence would support a different result. National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania v. Soto, 819 S.W.2d 619, 620 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1991, writ denied). When reviewing a hearing officer’s decision for factual sufficiency of the evidence we should reverse such decision only if it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust. Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986); Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tex. 1986).
In the present case, there was simply conflicting evidence, and it was the province of the hearing officer to resolve these conflicts. Applying the above standard of review, we find that the hearing officer’s decision regarding the extent of the claimant’s injury was sufficiently supported by the evidence in the record.
Eligibility criteria for SIBs entitlement are set forth in Section 408.142(a) and Rule 130.102. The SIBs criterion in issue in this case is whether or not the claimant has not returned to work as a direct result of his impairment from the compensable injury. The hearing officer found that this was not the case, as the claimant’s inability to work was caused by his lumbar spine condition and that the claimant’s lumbar spine was not part of his compensable injury. The claimant argues on appeal that his lumbar condition was part of his compensable injury and that even absent his lumbar condition, his compensable injury rendered him unable to work during the qualifying period for the eighth quarter. By affirming the hearing officer’s extent-of-injury determination we have already answered the former argument. In regard to the latter argument, it was the province of the hearing officer as the finder of fact to determine whether or not the claimant’s compensable injury rendered him unable to work. The hearing officer found that the claimant was unable to work during the qualifying period for the eighth quarter, but explained that this inability to work was due to impairment from his noncompensable lumbar problems, not from his compensable injury. As the finder of fact, the hearing officer determines what facts the evidence has established. Our review of the record reveals that the hearing officer’s determination that the claimant did not qualify for SIBs is supported by sufficient evidence and that it is not so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be clearly wrong or manifestly unjust. Thus, no sound basis exists for us to reverse the determination that the claimant is not entitled to SIBs for the eighth quarter on appeal. Cain, supra.
The decision and order of the hearing officer are affirmed.
The true corporate name of the insurance carrier is TEXAS PROPERTY & CASUALTY INSURANCE GUARANTY ASSOCIATION for Reliance National Indemnity Company, an impaired carrier and the name and address of its registered agent for service of process is
MARVIN KELLY, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
9120 BURNET ROAD
AUSTIN, TEXAS 78758.
Gary L. Kilgore
CONCUR:
Chris Cowan – Appeals Judge
Robert W. Potts – Appeals Judge