Court of Appeals of Texas, Dallas.

WELL-PRO SERVICES, L.P., Appellant

v.

RAMON TORRES, Appellee

No. 05-23-00773-CV

|

Opinion Filed April 30, 2025

On Appeal from the 101st Judicial District Court

Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. DC-19-09267

Before Justices Kennedy, Lewis, and Burns¹

Opinion by Justice Kennedy

MEMORANDUM OPINION

NANCY KENNEDY JUSTICE

*1 REVERSE AND RENDER and Opinion Filed April 30, 2025

Well-Pro Services, L.P. (“Well-Pro”) appeals from a trial court’s final judgment that awarded damages to appellee Ramon Torres on his claim against Well-Pro for personal injuries sustained while Well-Pro and Torres’s employer performed work as independent contractors on an oil and gas well. In four issues, Well-Pro challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury’s findings, the charge, and certain evidentiary rulings. We sustain Well-Pro’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting proximate causation. We reverse and render judgment that Torres take nothing on his claims against Well-Pro. Because all dispositive issues are settled in law, we issue this memorandum opinion. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(a), 47.4.

BACKGROUND

On May 31, 2018, Torres was injured while employed by Talon Tools &Testing (“Talon”), which was contracted by Dallas Production to reconfigure an oil and gas well it owned. More particularly, Dallas Production contracted Talon to conduct hydrostatic-pressure testing on the piping or “tubing”² that goes into wells in order to verify the integrity of the well tubing. Dallas Production contracted Well-Pro to assist in the removal of tubing using a “workover rig.”³

The testing of the tubing required employees from both Well-Pro and Talon to work together as follows. Well-Pro employees would drive the workover rig to the well hole, park the rig so that a temporary platform was created over the well hole, and raise up sections or “stands”⁴ of tubing for Talon’s workers to test. Talon’s operator, Craig Ford, would drive a Talon-owned tanker truck to the well hole. Well-Pro’s rig operator would run a stand of tubing into the hole along with the testing tool. Talon’s helper Torres would put the overshot⁵ in the stand of tubing to “fish out” the testing tool. Talon’s testing tool measured approximately seventy feet in length with a “stinger”⁶ at the end. The tool sealed at the bottom and at the top of the well hole into the well tubing with rubber grommets. Torres would insert the stinger into the top of the testing tool, or “fishing neck,” and would release the overshot. The Well-Pro employees would put a stand of tubing over the fishing neck to prevent any accidental release of stored energy. After Talon’s stinger was inserted and the next stand of tubing was in place, the operator of the tool, Craig Ford, sitting in the Talon tanker truck, would open a valve to a pressure pump located on Talon’s test truck, which caused water to be released into the testing tool through the stinger at approximately 7,000 pounds per square inch of pressure. Ford would then watch the gauge in his truck to see if the pressure level was maintained or lowered, which would indicate a leak in the tubing or the testing tool itself.

*2 On May 31, Talon conducted several pressure tests⁷ prior to conducting a test that indicated a leak in a section of the tubing. Talon’s operator Ford got out of the tanker truck, took replacement rubber grommets from the tanker truck to Torres and instructed him to pull up the testing tool and replace the rubber grommets on it in order to verify whether the leak was in the testing tool or the tubing that was being tested. Torres complied with the instruction and reassembled the testing tool. The Well-Pro employees then reinserted the testing tool to continue with conducting the hydrostatic-pressure testing. Torres inserted the stinger in the testing tool. Ford returned to the tanker truck and released the valve to pressurize the testing tool. Ford heard a loud “pop” and saw that the other employees were scrambling around and that Torres had been pinned to the floor of the workover rig by a large piece of the testing tool that had shot out of the well bore before descending to impale Torres through his left hip and leg, causing him severe injuries. It was later confirmed by those present on the rig that the next stand of tubing had not been put in place over the fishing neck of the testing tool before Ford pressurized the testing tool.

On June 28, 2019, Torres sued Dallas Production and Well-Pro for negligence. Dallas Production sought and obtained leave to designate Talon as a responsible third party before reaching a settlement agreement with Torres pursuant to which Torres nonsuited his claims against Dallas Production. Prior to trial, Torres amended his petition against Well-Pro, asserting claims in the alternative for negligence as operator of the workover rig, premises liability, and contemporaneous negligent activity. The case proceeded to trial before a jury, at the conclusion of which, the jury returned a verdict finding Well-Pro was liable to Torres for his injuries via either ordinary negligent or premises liability and assigned proportionate responsibility with Well-Pro at 46%, Dallas Production at 10%, and Talon at 44%. The jury awarded Torres $4,000,000 in compensatory damages.

On May 10, 2023, the trial court rendered final judgment finding that (1) Well-Pro was liable to Torres, (2) Well-Pro was proportionally responsible for 46% of Torres’s assessed damages, and (3) Torres could recover $1,840,000 in compensatory damages from Well-Pro, along with amounts for pre- and post-judgment interest. Well-Pro filed motions for new trial, to modify the jury’s verdict, and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The motions were overruled, and Well-Pro timely filed its notice of appeal.

DISCUSSION

In its second issue, Well-Pro challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support any jury findings on Torres’ negligent-activity and premises-liability claims. More specifically, Well-Pro challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury’s findings as to proximate causation, the standard of care and breach of same, what duty Well-Pro owed to Torres, and the jury’s determination of Well-Pro’s proportionate responsibility.

I. Standard of Review

“Evidence is legally insufficient to support a jury finding when (1) the record discloses a complete absence of evidence of a vital fact; (2) the court is barred by rules of law or of evidence from giving weight to the only evidence offered to prove a vital fact; (3) the evidence offered to prove a vital fact is no more than a mere scintilla; or (4) the evidence establishes conclusively the opposite of a vital fact.” JBS Carriers, Inc. v. Washington, 564 S.W.3d 830, 841 (Tex. 2018) (quoting Gunn v. McCoy, 554 S.W.3d 645, 658 (Tex. 2018)). We must consider all of the evidence “ ‘in the light most favorable to the party in whose favor the verdict has been rendered,’ and ‘every reasonable inference deducible from the evidence is to be indulged in that party’s favor.’ ” Id. at 841–42 (quoting Bustamante v. Ponte, 529 S.W.3d 447, 456 (Tex. 2017) (citing Gunn, 554 S.W.3d at 658)). If the evidence offered to prove a vital fact’s existence is “so weak as to do no more than create a mere surmise or suspicion,” the record contains less than a scintilla. Id. at 842.

*3 When conducting a factual-sufficiency review, we should not substitute our judgment for that of the jury and should “detail the evidence relevant to the issue in consideration and clearly state why the jury’s finding is factually insufficient or is so against the great weight and preponderance as to be manifestly unjust[,]” shock the conscience, “or clearly demonstrates bias.” Windrum v. Kareh, 581 S.W.3d 761, 781 (Tex. 2019) (citing Golden Eagle Archery, Inc. v. Jackson, 116 S.W.3d 757, 761 (Tex. 2003) (quoting Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tex. 1986)).

II. Causation

Well-Pro argues the record contains legally and factually insufficient evidence that any negligence by Well-Pro proximately caused Torres’s injuries, urging instead that the evidence conclusively shows Talon alone was responsible for the accident resulting in Torres’s injuries, that Torres failed to present sufficient evidence that Well-Pro’s contemporaneous act proximately caused the accident resulting in his injuries, and that Torres failed to present sufficient evidence of Well-Pro’s failure to use reasonable care to reduce or eliminate the risk that proximately caused the accident.

To prevail on either his negligence or premises-liability cause of action, Torres must establish the existence of a duty, a breach of that duty, and damages proximately caused by the breach. See W. Invests., Inc. v. Urena, 162 S.W.3d 547, 550–51 (Tex. 2005). Proximate cause has two elements: cause in fact and foreseeability. Id. at 551 (citing Travis v. City of Mesquite, 830 S.W.2d 94, 98 (Tex. 1992)). “These elements cannot be established by mere conjecture, guess, or speculation.” Id. (quoting Doe v. Boys Clubs of Greater Dallas, Inc., 907 S.W.2d 472, 477 (Tex. 1995)). The test for cause in fact is whether the act or omission was a substantial factor in causing the injury without which the harm would not have occurred. Id. (citing Marathon Corp. v. Pitzner, 106 S.W.3d 724, 727 (Tex. 2003)). If the defendant’s negligence merely furnished a condition that made the injuries possible, there can be no cause in fact. Id. (citing IHS Cedars Treatment Ctr. of Desoto, Tex., Inc. v. Mason, 143 S.W.3d 794, 799 (Tex. 2004)). In other words, the conduct of the defendant may be too attenuated from the resulting injuries to the plaintiff to be a substantial factor in bringing about the harm. Mason, 143 S.W.3d at 799.

According to Well-Pro, the evidence established Talon owned the testing tool and was responsible for inspecting and assembling it, Well-Pro did not control or otherwise determine when Ford released the valve to pressurize the testing tool, and that it was Ford’s premature pressurization of the testing tool prior to the next stand being placed over the testing tool that proximately caused the accident. Indeed, Well-Pro argues that “but for the failure of Talon’s test tool—which Talon employees put together and exclusively used—the well would have remained safe.” The evidence in the record supports that the testing tool was Talon’s equipment and assembled and used by Talon’s employees Ford and Torres. And, Torres conceded in his testimony that if the testing tool had not broken, the accident would not have happened.

According to Torres, there was more than one proximate cause of the accident, including: Well-Pro’s rig operator’s signaling to Torres to insert the stinger before the next stand of tubing was in place over the testing tool; Well-Pro’s failure to place the next stand of tubing over the testing tool before Ford pressurized the testing tool; and Well-Pro’s failure to pause and reset the repetitive testing process so that Ford’s muscle memory from the previous testing that day would not have overridden his training to wait for the next stand of tubing to be in place. In support of his arguments, Torres points to his testimony and that of his expert Joseph Barnes.

*4 Reviewing the record, we begin by noting that all the evidence supports a conclusion that Ford’s pressurization of the testing tool before the next stand of tubing was in place over the testing tool was a substantial factor in bringing about the accident resulting in Torres’s injuries. And, we note that there may be more than one proximate cause of an accident and that a defendant’s act or omission need not be the sole cause of an injury, as long as it is a substantial factor in bringing about the injury. See Windrum v. Kareh, 581 S.W.3d 761, 777 (Tex. 2019).

As to cause in fact, Torres testified he inserted the stinger into the testing tool at the Well-Pro rig operator’s signal and that his understanding of the procedure was the helper would insert the stinger and remove the overshot before the Well-Pro operator had the next stand of tubing in place and that Ford would pressurize the testing tool when he saw the stinger inserted. Ford testified he watched for Torres to insert the stinger and that the stinger was in place before he started the pressure. Thus, there was some evidence that Ford pressurized the testing tool when he did because he saw Torres insert the stinger and that Torres only did so because the Well-Pro rig operator signaled him to do so. The evidence of any failure by Well-Pro to put the next stand of tubing in place was limited to the testimony that had the next stand of tubing been in place the accident would not have occurred.

Torres testified that he looked to Well-Pro’s rig operator, considered the rig operator to be in charge, and looked for the rig operator’s signal to put the stinger in place. Torres testified he would not put the stinger in if the rig operator did not communicate to him to do so, that he would wait until the rig operator indicated he was ready, and just before the accident he received from the rig operator some indication the rig operator “was ready to go.” Torres’s expert Barnes testified that when a testing crew like Talon’s is on a rig like Well-Pro’s, Well-Pro is considered in charge or the “captain of the ship.”

Well-Pro argues that any negligence in its rig operator’s signaling to Torres to insert the stinger into the testing tool only furnished the condition that made the injury possible, arguing that it was Ford’s action in pressurizing the testing tool before the next stand of tubing was in place over the tool was the actual cause of the accident that resulted in Torres’s injuries. See Johannes v. Ace Transp., Inc., 346 S.W.3d 640, 643 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2009, no pet.) (negligence of truck driver in initially damaging electric pole was not proximate cause of city employee’s injuries when he later worked on pole that city had not de-energized).

In addition to Well Pro’s argument, we consider whether Ford’s act of pressuring the testing tool before the next stand of tubing was in place over the testing tool was a new and independent, or superseding, cause that intervened between Well-Pro’s signal to Torres—or any delay in putting up the next stand of tubing—and the accident that injured Torres. See Stanfield v. Neubaum, 494 S.W.3d 90, 97–98 (Tex. 2016). A new and independent cause destroys any causal connection between the defendant’s negligence and the plaintiff’s harm, such that the injury is attributed to the new cause rather than the first and more remote cause and precludes the plaintiff from establishing the defendant’s negligence as a proximate cause. See id. at 97. In contrast, a concurring cause “concurs with the continuing and co-operating original negligence in working the injury,” leaving the causal connection between the defendant’s negligence and the plaintiff’s harm intact. See id. at 98 (quoting Gulf, C. &S.F. Ry. Co. v. Ballew, 66 S.W.2d 659, 661 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1933, holding approved)). The crucial distinction between a superseding cause and a concurring cause is the intervening cause’s effect on the chain of causation. Id. In evaluating the existence of a superseding cause, “[t]he question always is, was there an unbroken connection? Would the facts constitute a continuous succession of events so linked together as to make a natural whole, or was there some new and independent cause intervening between the wrong and the injury?” Id. (quoting Tex. &P. Ry. Co. v. Bigham, 38 S.W. 162, 164 (Tex. 1896)).

*5 In assessing whether an intervening cause disrupted the causal connection between the defendant’s negligence and the plaintiff’s harm and constitutes a new and independent cause, we consider a variety of factors, including foreseeability. Stanfield, 494 S.W.3d at 98. If the intervening cause and its probable consequences are a reasonably foreseeable result of the defendant’s negligence, the intervening cause “is a concurring cause as opposed to a superseding or new and independent cause.” Id. (quoting Columbia Rio Grande Healthcare, L.P. v. Hawley, 284 S.W.3d 851, 857 (Tex. 2009) (emphasis in original). But if “nothing short of prophetic ken could have anticipated the happening of the combination of events” by which the original negligence led to an intervening force that resulted in the plaintiff’s injury, the harm is not reasonably foreseeable. Id. (quoting Bigham, 38 S.W. at 164). Foreseeability is a highly fact-specific inquiry that must be determined “in the light of the attending circumstances,” not in the abstract. See id. (quoting Milwaukee &St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Kellogg, 94 U.S. 469, 475 (1876)).

An intervening cause can destroy the causal connection between the original negligence and the harm, even if the original negligence is the “but for” cause of the intervening cause. Stanfield, 494 S.W.3d at 99 (citing Bell v. Campbell, 434 S.W.2d 117, 120–22 (Tex. 1968) (second collision was a new and independent cause even though the original negligence “created the condition that made the second collision possible”). An intervening cause supersedes the original negligence when it “alters the natural sequence of events,” causes injuries that would not otherwise have occurred, was not brought into operation by the original wrongful acts of the defendant, and operates entirely independently of the defendant’s negligent act or omission. Id. (quoting Hawley, 284 S.W.3d at 857).

In this case, all witnesses, including Torres, testified that Ford was trained to wait to pressure up until the next stand of tubing was in place and that Well-Pro did not signal to him to pressurize the testing tool. Although Torres testified that Well-Pro’s rig operator was in charge of everything and everyone “on the floor of the workover rig,” he and all other witnesses testified that Ford, as the testing truck operator, was not on the workover rig when he pressurized the testing tool. Instead, he was in the testing truck from where he had an unobstructed view of whether the next standing of tubing was in place over the testing tool. Although Ford testified he watched for his helper to insert the stinger, he also testified that he was trained to wait to pressure up until the next stand of tubing was in place. Additionally, Ford testified that no one from Well-Pro was in charge of anyone from Talon, including Torres and himself.

Thus, the question is whether it was reasonably foreseeable that Well-Pro’s rig operator’s signal to Torres and delay in placing the next stand of tubing over the testing tool would cause Ford to pressurize the testing tool before the next stand of tubing was in place. In light of the testimony that Ford was trained to and was able to see whether the next stand of tubing was in place and that he alone was responsible for pressurizing the testing tool, not Well-Pro, we conclude his action in pressurizing the testing tool prior to the placement of the next stand of tubing was a new and independent, or superseding, cause. We agree with Well-Pro that the rig operator’s signal to Torres and any delay in placing the next stand of tubing over the testing tool only furnished the condition for the accident.

As for any causation due to any failure by Well-Pro to take a break or pause in the procedure, Torres introduced the following evidence to support his theory that any such failure caused the accident. His expert Barnes testified the procedure of testing the tubing is continuous, rhythmic, and repetitive, and that he believed Ford “acted in muscle memory” in pressurizing the testing tool instead of waiting until the rig operator had put the next stand of tubing in place before he pressured up. Barnes testified that when the procedure stopped to verify a leak just before the accident occurred, it would have been the responsibility and requirement of Well-Pro’s rig operator to make sure that after the rubbers on the testing tool were changed the procedure was stopped to give the Well-Pro and Talon employees the opportunity to “regroup” and “reset not just the tool, but your people, and reset what you’re doing together with the other organization.” Torres testified that none of the employees took a break or paused the procedure after replacing the rubbers on the testing tool before reinserting the testing tool and restarting the testing procedure.

*6 We conclude the foregoing is insufficient evidence of proximate cause. As for Barnes’s testimony about muscle memory, he could only state his belief that it was Ford’s muscle memory and a lack of break or pause to reset the procedure that caused Ford to pressurize the testing tool before the next stand of tubing was in place. See Mason, 143 S.W.3d at 798–99 (elements of proximate causation “cannot be satisfied by mere conjecture, guess, or speculation”). Moreover, we agree with Well-Pro that such evidence does no more than furnish a condition which made the injuries possible here and further conclude the conduct here is “too attenuated from the resulting injuries to the plaintiff to be a substantial factor in bringing about the harm.” See id. at 799.

We sustain Well-Pro’s second issue and need not address its remaining arguments and issues. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.4.⁸

CONCLUSION

We reverse and render judgment that Torres take nothing on his claims against Well-Pro.

JUDGMENT

Opinion delivered by Justice Kennedy. Justices Lewis and Burns participating.

In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is REVERSED and judgment is RENDERED that:

[RAMON TORRES] take nothing on his claims against [WELL-PRO SERVICES, L.P.]

It is ORDERED that appellant WELL-PRO SERVICES, L.P. recover its costs of this appeal from appellee RAMON TORRES.

Judgment entered this 30^th day of April 2025.

Footnotes
1	The Hon. Robert Burns, Justice, Assigned
2	Throughout this opinion, we use industry terminology as used by witnesses at trial. Here, Well-Pro’s expert witness at trial defined tubing as “just pipe that’s screwed together, and it’s the producing conduit for the oil and gas.” Torres’s expert witness similarly indicated “tubing” referred to “the pipe” in the well.
3	At trial, the jury heard witness testimony that a workover rig is a drivable piece of equipment used for maintenance of a well, mainly to pull the tubing in the well.
4	One witness defined a “stand of tubing” as “two joints connected together” and “representative of the amount of tubing that needed to be run into the well.” When describing and referring to the testing process, Well-Pro’s expert referred to a section of tubing as a “joint or stand of tubing,” and other witnesses referred to a section of tubing more consistently as “stand.”
5	At trial, witnesses referred to the following photograph to explain the process and the terms used therein. Tabular or graphical material not displayable at this time.
6	See footnote 5 supra.
7	The number of tests conducted according to different witnesses’ testimony varies, but at least ten tests were performed that morning before the accident occurred.
8	In its first issue, Well-Pro argues there was no jury finding to support that it had control over Torres or his supervisor, there was no conclusive evidence to support such a finding, and the failure to submit a control question is fatal to Torres’s negligence and premises-liability claims against Well-Pro. In its third issue, Well-Pro urges the trial court erred by submitting an erroneous definition of “condition” and an improper damages question to the jury. In its fourth and final issue, Well-Pro asserts the trial court erred by permitting Torres’s counsel to introduce evidence of workers’ compensation insurance and unsupported, irrelevant expert testimony.