This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 et seq. (1989 Act). A contested case hearing was held on January 15, 2003. The hearing officer determined that the respondent’s (claimant) ____________, compensable injury does extend to and include an injury to the right wrist and hand in the form of tenosynovitis and bursitis; that the claimant had disability beginning on July 31, 2002, and continuing through January 6, 2003; and that the claimant is entitled to change treating doctors pursuant to Section 408.022. The appellant (carrier) appealed on sufficiency of the evidence grounds. The claimant responded, urging affirmance.
DECISION
Affirmed.
We have reviewed the complained-of determinations and find that the hearing officer’s Decision and Order is supported by sufficient evidence to be affirmed. The issues of extent of injury and disability presented questions of fact for the hearing officer to resolve. The hearing officer is the sole judge of the weight and credibility of the evidence. Section 410.165(a); Texas Employers Ins. Ass’n v. Campos, 666 S.W.2d 286 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ). There was conflicting evidence presented on the disputed issues. It was for the hearing officer, as the trier of fact, to resolve the conflicts and inconsistencies in the evidence and to determine what facts had been established. Garza v. Commercial Ins. Co., 508 S.W.2d 701 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, no writ). Nothing in our review of the record reveals that the hearing officer’s determinations regarding extent of injury and disability are so contrary to the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be clearly wrong or manifestly unjust. As such, no sound basis exists for us to reverse those determinations on appeal. Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986).
Regarding the change of treating doctor issue, we review that matter on an abuse-of-discretion standard. There is an abuse of discretion when a decision maker reaches a decision without reference to guiding rules or principles (Morrow v. H.E.B., Inc., 714 S.W.2d 297 (Tex. 1986)). The hearing officer made a factual determination that the claimant did not change doctors in order to secure an off work note nor a medical report, and that the Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission did not abuse its discretion in approving the claimant’s request. Because we find sufficient evidence in the record to support the hearing officer’s findings in this regard, we cannot say that the hearing officer abused her discretion.
The hearing officer’s decision and order are affirmed.
The true corporate name of the insurance carrier is CONNECTICUT INDEMNITY COMPANY and the name and address of its registered agent for service of process is
CORPORATION SERVICE COMPANY
800 BRAZOS
AUSTIN, TEXAS 78701.
Daniel R. Barry – Appeals Judge
CONCUR:
Elaine M. Chaney – Appeals Judge
Thomas A. Knapp – Appeals Judge