This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 et seq. (1989 Act). A contested case hearing was held on February 11, 2003. The hearing officer determined that the appellant’s (claimant) _____________, compensable injury does not extend to or include an injury to the cervical spine, and that the claimant reached maximum medical improvement (MMI) on January 20, 2000, with a 3% impairment rating (IR) pursuant to the certification of the Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission-selected designated doctor. The claimant has appealed these determinations, and the respondent (carrier) responded, urging affirmance.
DECISION
Affirmed.
The disputed issues in this case presented questions of fact for the hearing officer to resolve. The claimant offered evidence to support her position regarding the extent of her compensable injury, that she did not reach MMI until the statutory date, and that her IR should be 35%. The carrier offered evidence to the contrary. The claimant had the burden of proof on the disputed issues. There is conflicting evidence in this case. The 1989 Act makes the hearing officer the sole judge of the weight and credibility to be given to the evidence. Section 410.165(a). As the trier of fact, the hearing officer may believe all, part, or none of the testimony of any witness. Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 950084, decided February 28, 1995. The finder of fact may believe that the claimant has an injury, but disbelieve the claimant’s testimony that the injury occurred at work as claimed. Johnson v. Employers Reinsurance Corporation, 351 S.W.2d 936 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1961, no writ). A fact finder is not bound by the testimony (or evidence) of a medical witness where the credibility of that testimony (or evidence) is manifestly dependent upon the credibility of the information imparted to the medical witness by the claimant. Rowland v. Standard Fire Insurance Company, 489 S.W.2d 151 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1972, writ ref’d n.r.e.). An appellate-level body is not a fact finder and does not normally pass upon the credibility of witnesses or substitute its judgment for that of the trier of fact, even if the evidence would support a different result. When reviewing a hearing officer’s decision to determine the factual sufficiency of the evidence, we should set aside the decision only if it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust. Appeal No. 950084, supra. Under our standard of review, we conclude that the hearing officer’s findings, conclusions, and decision are supported by sufficient evidence and that they are not so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust. Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986). This is so even though another fact finder might have drawn other inferences and reached other conclusions. Salazar, et al. v. Hill, 551 S.W.2d 518 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1977, writ ref’d n.r.e.).
The hearing officer’s decision and order are affirmed.
The true corporate name of the insurance carrier is ZURICH AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY and the name and address of its registered agent for service of process is
LEO MALO
12222 MERIT DRIVE, SUITE 700
DALLAS, TEXAS 75251.
Daniel R. Barry – Appeals Judge
CONCUR:
Judy L. S. Barnes – Appeals Judge
Chris Cowan – Appeals Judge