This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 et seq. (1989 Act). A contested case hearing (CCH) was held on March 17, 2003. The hearing officer resolved the disputed issues by deciding that the respondent (claimant) sustained a compensable injury on ______________, and had disability beginning on February 28 and continuing through June 22, 2000. The appellant (carrier) appealed the determinations of compensability and disability on sufficiency of the evidence grounds and asserted evidentiary error. The claimant responded, urging affirmance.
DECISION
Affirmed.
The carrier asserts that the hearing officer erred in admitting Claimant’s Exhibits Nos. 2, 3, 7, 8, and 9. The carrier objected to this admission at the CCH on the grounds that the documents had not been timely exchanged. Parties must exchange documentary evidence with each other not later than 15 days after the benefit review conference and thereafter, as it becomes available. Tex. W.C. Comm’n, 28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 142.13(c) (Rule 142.13(c)). The claimant argued that the documents were timely exchanged. Our standard of review regarding the hearing officer’s evidentiary rulings is one of abuse of discretion. Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 92165, decided June 5, 1992. To obtain reversal of a judgment based upon the hearing officer’s abuse of discretion in the admission or exclusion of evidence, an appellant must first show that the admission or exclusion was in fact an abuse of discretion, and also that the error was reasonably calculated to cause and probably did cause the rendition of an improper judgment. Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 92241, decided July 24, 1992; see also Hernandez v. Hernandez, 611 S.W.2d 732 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1981, no writ). In determining whether there has been an abuse of discretion, the Appeals Panel looks to see whether the hearing officer acted without reference to any guiding rules or principles. Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 951943, decided January 2, 1996; Morrow v. H.E.B., Inc., 714 S.W.2d 297 (Tex. 1986). It was a factual issue for the hearing officer to determine whether or not the documents were in fact timely exchanged, and, if not, if there was good cause for such failure. We do not find the hearing officer’s ruling to be an abuse of discretion, nor can we say that the hearing officer acted without reference to guiding rules and principles. Nor did the carrier establish that the evidentiary error it asserts probably caused the rendition of an improper judgment.
The claimant had the burden to prove that she sustained a compensable injury as defined by Section 401.011(10) and that she had disability as defined by Section 401.011(16). Conflicting evidence was presented on the disputed issues. The hearing officer is the sole judge of the weight and credibility of the evidence. Section 410.165(a). As the finder of fact, the hearing officer resolves the conflicts in the evidence and determines what facts have been established. Although there is conflicting evidence, we conclude that the hearing officer’s decision is supported by the claimant’s testimony and by the medical records in evidence. See Section 410.163(b). The hearing officer’s decision is supported by sufficient evidence and is not so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust. Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175 (Tex. 1986).
We affirm the decision and order of the hearing officer.
The true corporate name of the insurance carrier is TEXAS PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE GUARANTY ASSOCIATION for Reliance National Insurance Company, an impaired carrier and the name and address of its registered agent for service of process is
MARVIN KELLY
9120 BURNET ROAD
AUSTIN, TEXAS 78757.
Margaret L. Turner
CONCUR:
Elaine M. Chaney – Appeals Judge
Gary L. Kilgore – Appeals Judge