This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 et seq. (1989 Act). A contested case hearing was held on March 10, 2003. The hearing officer resolved the disputed issues by deciding that the respondent (claimant) sustained a compensable injury on ______________; that the compensable injury sustained on ______________, does include a lumbar sprain/strain and lumbar spine MRI findings dated June 24, 2002, specifically, an internal disc derangement at L3-L4, L4-L5 and L5-S1, and canal stenosis at the L4-L5 level; and, that the claimant had disability from May 14 through August 31, 2002, but not from September 1, 2002, through the date of the hearing. The appellant (carrier) appealed, arguing that the hearing officer’s determinations are against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. The claimant responded, urging affirmance.
DECISION
Affirmed.
The claimant had the burden to prove that he sustained a compensable injury as defined by Section 401.011(10) and that he had disability as defined by Section 401.011(16). The claimant also had the burden of proof on the extent-of-injury issue. Section 410.165(a) provides that the hearing officer, as finder of fact, is the sole judge of the relevance and materiality of the evidence as well as of the weight and credibility that is to be given to the evidence. It was for the hearing officer, as trier of fact, to resolve the inconsistencies and conflicts in the evidence. Garza v. Commercial Insurance Company of Newark, New Jersey, 508 S.W.2d 701 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, no writ). This is equally true regarding medical evidence. Texas Employers Insurance Association v. Campos, 666 S.W.2d 286 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ). The trier of fact may believe all, part, or none of the testimony of any witness. Taylor v. Lewis, 553 S.W.2d 153 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1977, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Aetna Insurance Company v. English, 204 S.W.2d 850 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1947, no writ). An appeals-level body is not a fact finder and does not normally pass upon the credibility of witnesses or substitute its own judgment for that of the trier of fact, even if the evidence would support a different result. National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania v. Soto, 819 S.W.2d 619, 620 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1991, writ denied). When reviewing a hearing officer’s decision for factual sufficiency of the evidence we should reverse such decision only if it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust, and we do not find that to be the case here. Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986); Pool v. Ford Motor Company, 715 S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tex. 1986).
We affirm the hearing officer’s decision and order.
The true corporate name of the insurance carrier is UNITED STATES FIDELITY & GUARANTY COMPANY and the name and address of its registered agent for service of process is
CORPORATION SERVICE COMPANY
800 BRAZOS
AUSTIN, TEXAS 78701.
Veronica L. Ruberto
CONCUR:
Judy L. S. Barnes – Appeals Judge
Chris Cowan – Appeals Judge