This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 et seq. (1989 Act). A contested case hearing was held on July 17, 2003. The hearing officer determined that the appellant (claimant) did not sustain a compensable repetitive trauma injury on _____________; that the claimant did not timely notify his employer of an injury; and that, because the claimant did not sustain a compensable injury, he did not have disability. The claimant appealed, arguing that the hearing officer’s determinations are against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. The respondent (carrier) responded, urging affirmance.
DECISION
Affirmed.
The claimant had the burden to prove that he sustained a compensable injury, that he gave timely notice of the injury to his employer, and that he has had disability. The claimant claimed that he sustained a repetitive trauma injury as a result of performing his work activities for the employer. Section 401.011(34) provides that an occupational disease includes a repetitive trauma injury, which is defined in Section 401.011(36). Section 408.007 provides that the date of injury for an occupational disease is the date on which the employee knew or should have known that the disease may be related to the employment. Section 409.001(a) provides that, if the injury is an occupational disease, an employee or a person acting on the employee’s behalf shall notify the employer of the employee of an injury not later than the 30th day after the date on which the employee knew or should have known that the injury may be related to the employment.
Conflicting evidence was presented regarding the disputed issues. The hearing officer is the sole judge of the weight and credibility of the evidence. Section 410.165(a). As the finder of fact, the hearing officer resolves the conflicts in the evidence and determines what facts have been established. The finder of fact may believe that the claimant has an injury, but disbelieve that the injury occurred at work as claimed. Johnson v. Employers Reinsurance Corp., 351 S.W.2d 936 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1961, no writ). Our review of the record reveals that the hearing officer’s determinations regarding compensable injury and timely notice are supported by sufficient evidence and are not so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be clearly wrong or manifestly unjust. Accordingly, no sound basis exists for us to disturb the challenged determinations on appeal. Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175 (Tex. 1986).
The 1989 Act requires the existence of a compensable injury as a prerequisite to a finding of disability. Section 401.011(16). Because we have affirmed the determination that the claimant did not sustain a compensable injury, we likewise affirm the determination that he did not have disability.
We affirm the decision and order of the hearing officer.
The true corporate name of the insurance carrier is LIBERTY MUTUAL FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY and the name and address of its registered agent for service of process is
CT CORPORATION SYSTEMS
350 NORTH ST. PAUL STREET, SUITE 2900
DALLAS, TEXAS 75201.
Margaret L. Turner
CONCUR:
Elaine M. Chaney – Appeals Judge
Edward Vilano – Appeals Judge