This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 et seq. (1989 Act). A contested case hearing was held on September 30, 2003. The hearing officer decided that the appellant (claimant herein) did not sustain a compensable injury in the form of an occupational disease, that the claimant failed to timely report her alleged injury without good cause for failing to do so; and that the claimant did not have disability. The claimant appeals, contending that these determinations were contrary to the evidence. The respondent (carrier herein) replies that the decision was supported by the evidence.
DECISION
Finding sufficient evidence to support the decision of the hearing officer and no reversible error in the record, we affirm the decision and order of the hearing officer.
INJURY
The question of whether an injury occurred is one of fact. Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 93854, decided November 9, 1993; Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 93449, decided July 21, 1993. Section 410.165(a) provides that the hearing officer, as finder of fact, is the sole judge of the relevance and materiality of the evidence as well as of the weight and credibility that is to be given to the evidence. It was for the hearing officer, as trier of fact, to resolve the inconsistencies and conflicts in the evidence. Garza v. Commercial Insurance Company of Newark, New Jersey, 508 S.W.2d 701, 702 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, no writ). This is equally true regarding medical evidence. Texas Employers Insurance Association v. Campos, 666 S.W.2d 286, 290 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ). The trier of fact may believe all, part, or none of the testimony of any witness. Taylor v. Lewis, 553 S.W.2d 153, 161 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1977, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Aetna Insurance Co. v. English, 204 S.W.2d 850 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1947, no writ). An appeals-level body is not a fact finder and does not normally pass upon the credibility of witnesses or substitute its own judgment for that of the trier of fact, even if the evidence would support a different result. National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania v. Soto, 819 S.W.2d 619, 620 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1991, writ denied). When reviewing a hearing officer’s decision for factual sufficiency of the evidence we should reverse such decision only if it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust. Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986); Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tex. 1986). In light of the conflicting evidence concerning injury in the record, and applying this standard, we cannot say that the hearing officer erred as a matter of law in finding no repetitive trauma injury.
TIMELY REPORT OF INJURY
The 1989 Act generally requires that an injured employee or person acting on the employee’s behalf notify the employer of the injury not later than 30 days after the injury occurred. Section 409.001. The 1989 Act provides that a determination by the Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission that good cause exists for failure to provide notice of injury to an employer in a timely manner or actual knowledge of the injury by the employer can relieve the claimant of the requirement to timely report the injury. Section 409.002. The burden is on the claimant to prove the existence of notice of injury. Travelers Insurance Company v. Miller, 390 S.W.2d 284 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1965, no writ). We cannot say that the hearing officer erred as matter of law in finding that the claimant failed to sustain this burden or in determining that the claimant did not have good cause for failing to timely report her injury.
DISABILITY
Finally, with no compensable injury found, there is no loss upon which to find disability. By definition disability depends upon a compensable injury. See Section 401.011 (16).
We affirm the decision and order of the hearing officer.
The true corporate name of the insurance carrier is TEXAS MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY and the name and address of its registered agent for service of process is
MR. RUSSELL OLIVER, PRESIDENT
221 WEST 6TH STREET, SUITE 300
AUSTIN, TEXAS 78701-3403.
Gary L. Kilgore
CONCUR:
Chris Cowan – Appeals Judge
Margaret L. Turner – Appeals Judge