This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 et seq. (1989 Act). A contested case hearing was held on November 13, 2003. The hearing officer determined that the respondent’s (claimant) compensable injury of _____________, includes an injury to the low back after (subsequent date of injury).
The appellant (carrier) appeals, contending that the claimant’s 1996 injury had completely resolved and that the claimant had sustained a new and separate (non-work related) injury on (subsequent date of injury). The claimant responds, urging affirmance.
DECISION
Affirmed.
The parties stipulated that the claimant sustained a compensable (low back strain) injury on _____________. An MRI was performed on November 19, 1996, which showed moderate disc degeneration with a “disc bulging effacing the thecal sac” at L4-5. The claimant had some physical therapy, returned to work (first at light duty and then regular duty), and was certified at maximum medical improvement on December 4, 1996, with a 7% impairment rating. In 2001 the claimant saw his family doctor (or primary care physician) for low back pain and leg numbness and was prescribed pain medication and anti-inflammatories. The claimant again suffered low back pain and leg numbness on (subsequent date of injury), getting out of bed. An MRI was performed on June 11, 2003, which showed 2-3 mm disc protrusions at L4-5 and L5-S1. The claimant’s treating doctor for the 1996 injury, in a report dated September 12, 2003, reviewed both MRIs and concluded that “there is no evidence of a new injury.” The carrier’s peer review doctor noted “after reading the two MRI reports from 1996 and 2003 there is no significant change in diagnostic findings.” The peer review doctor speculates that the claimant “sustained some type of intervening injury” which is denied by the claimant.
The hearing officer did not err in determining that the claimant’s compensable 1996 injury includes injury to the low back after (subsequent date of injury). Conflicting evidence was presented on the disputed issues. The hearing officer is the sole judge of the weight and credibility of the evidence. Section 410.165(a). This is equally true of medical evidence. Texas Employers Insurance Association v. Campos, 666 S.W.2d 286 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ). As the trier of fact, the hearing officer resolves the conflicts in the evidence and determines what facts have been established. The hearing officer’s decision is supported by sufficient evidence and is not so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust. Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986).
The hearing officer’s decision and order are affirmed.
The true corporate name of the insurance carrier is (a self-insured governmental entity) and the name and address of its registered agent for service of process is
VB
(ADDRESS)
(CITY), TEXAS (ZIP CODE).
Thomas A. Knapp – Appeals Judge
CONCUR:
Margaret L. Turner – Appeals Judge
CONCURRING OPINION:
I concur with the majority opinion. I write separately to make it clear that even had there been an intervening injury it would not have relieved the carrier of liability unless the carrier showed that the intervening injury was the sole cause of the claimant’s back condition after (subsequent date of injury). See Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 93864, decided November 10, 1993, and cases cited therein.
Gary L. Kilgore – Appeals Judge