Title: 

APD 023171

Significant Decision

Date: 

January 13, 2003

Issues: 

Extent of Injury

Table of Contents

APD 023171

This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 et seq. (1989 Act). A contested case hearing was held on November 12, 2002. The hearing officer determined that the appellant’s (claimant) _____________, compensable injury does not extend to psychological problems. The claimant appealed, asserting that the hearing officer committed reversible evidentiary error and on sufficiency of the evidence grounds. The respondent (carrier) responded, urging affirmance.

DECISION

Affirmed.

First, we address the claimant’s evidentiary objections. The claimant asserts that the hearing officer erred in admitting some of the carrier’s evidence and excluding some of his. To obtain a reversal on the basis of admission or exclusion of evidence, it must be shown that the ruling admitting or excluding the evidence was error and that error was reasonably calculated to cause and probably did cause rendition of an improper judgment. Hernandez v. Hernandez, 611 S.W.2d 732 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1981, no writ). It has also been stated that reversible error is not ordinarily shown in connection with rulings on questions of evidence unless the whole case turns on the particular evidence admitted or excluded. Atlantic Mutual Insurance Company v. Middleman, 661 S.W.2d 182 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1983, writ ref’d n.r.e.). We conclude that the claimant has not shown that the error, if any, in the admission of carrier’s evidence and exclusion of the claimant’s evidence amounted to reversible error.

The hearing officer did not err in reaching the complained-of determination. The issue of extent of injury involves a question of fact for the hearing officer to resolve. The evidence before the hearing officer was conflicting. The hearing officer is the sole judge of the weight and credibility of the evidence (Section 410.165(a)) and, as the trier of fact, resolves the conflicts and inconsistencies in the evidence, including the medical evidence (Texas Employers Insurance Association v. Campos, 666 S.W.2d 286 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ)). Nothing in our review of the record demonstrates that the challenged determination is so against the great weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong or manifestly unjust. Accordingly, no sound basis exists for us to disturb those determinations on appeal. Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986). This is so even though another fact finder may well have drawn different inferences from the evidence which would have supported a different result. Salazar, et al. v. Hill, 551 S.W.2d 518 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1977, writ ref’d n.r.e.).

We affirm the decision and order of the hearing officer.

The true corporate name of the insurance carrier is INSURANCE COMPANY OF THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA and the name and address of its registered agent for service of process is

CORPORATION SERVICE COMPANY

800 BRAZOS, SUITE 750, COMMODORE 1

AUSTIN, TEXAS 78701.

Daniel R. Barry – Appeals Judge

CONCUR:

Thomas A. Knapp – Appeals Judge

Robert W. Potts – Appeals Judge