Court of Appeals of Texas, Houston (14th Dist.).
IN RE BD TRUCKING and Basil Odigie, Relators
NO. 14-25-00735-CV
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Opinion filed February 24, 2026
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING WRIT OF MANDAMUS, 189th District Court, Harris County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 2024-28471
Attorneys & Firms
Rachel Hancock, Carin Marcussen, for Relator.
Panel consists of Justices Wilson, Hart, and McLaughlin.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
PER CURIAM
*1 Relators BD Trucking and Basil Odigie filed a petition for writ of mandamus, asking this court to compel the trial court to vacate its August 19, 2025 order denying relators’ motion for leave to designate a responsible third party. For the reasons detailed below, we conditionally grant the petition for writ of mandamus, and order the trial court to vacate the order.
Background
The underlying proceedings began when real party in interest Roberto M. Vargas sued BD Trucking and its employee, Odigie, after a 2023 workplace injury. In the suit, Vargas claims he was hurt at a well-site in New Mexico while working for Halliburton. He states he fell from a manlift raised 25 feet in the air as he attempted to collect samples from a sandbox sitting on a BD Trucking tractor trailer. Vargas claims the manlift collided with the tractor trailer and toppled when Odigie, who worked for BD Trucking, drove the tractor trailer forward. Vargas alleges he sustained serious injuries as a result of the fall. He sued BD Trucking and Odigie in May 2024, claiming negligence and seeking damages. The trial court set the trial for September 2, 2025.
BD Trucking and Odigie on June 10, 2025 filed and served a motion for leave to designate Vargas’ employer, Halliburton, as a responsible third party. Vargas filed a response objecting to the motion on June 24, 2025 because he claimed the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act barred BD Trucking and Odigie from designating Halliburton as a responsible third party. Vargas stated that Halliburton subscribed to workers’ compensation insurance coverage and that he received worker’s compensation benefits from Halliburton relating to the incident. Further, Vargas claimed that the motion failed to plead sufficient facts to designate Halliburton a responsible third party. The trial court denied BD Trucking and Odigie’s motion to designate Halliburton as a responsible third party in the August 19, 2025 order at issue in the mandamus petition. Vargas in his response to the mandamus petition stated that he no longer opposes the designation of Halliburton as a responsible third party.
Standard of Review
Generally, to be entitled to mandamus relief, relator must establish that (1) the trial court abused its discretion; and (2) relator has no adequate remedy by appeal. In re Williams Companies, Inc., No. 14-23-00267-CV, 2023 WL 7401495, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Nov. 9, 2023, orig. proceeding) (per curiam) (mem. op.); see In re Christianson Air Conditioning & Plumbing, LLC, 639 S.W.3d 671, 681 (Tex. 2022) (orig. proceeding). A trial court clearly abuses its discretion if it reaches a decision so arbitrary and unreasonable as to amount to a clear and prejudicial error of law or if it clearly fails to analyze the law correctly or apply the law correctly to the facts. Williams Companies, Inc., 2023 WL 7401495, at *3. Ordinarily, no adequate remedy by appeal exists from the erroneous denial of a timely filed motion to designate a responsible third party. Williams Companies, Inc., 2023 WL 7401495, at *3; see In re YRC, Inc., 646 S.W.3d 805, 810 (Tex. 2022) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam).
Analysis
*2 Chapter 33 of the Texas Civil Practices and Remedies Code sets forth the Texas proportionate responsibility law. Williams Companies, Inc., 2023 WL 7401495, at *4; See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §§ 33.001–33.017. “These statutes allow a tort defendant to designate as a responsible third party a person who is alleged to have caused in any way the harm for which the plaintiff seeks damages.” Williams Companies, Inc., 2023 WL 7401495, at *4; see also Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 33.011(6) (defining “responsible third party” as “any person who is alleged to have caused or contributed to causing in any way the harm for which recovery of damages is sought”).
Timeliness Section 33.004(a) permits a tort defendant to designate a person as a responsible third party by filing a motion “on or before the 60th day before the trial date unless the court finds good cause to allow the motion to be filed at a later date.” Williams Companies, Inc., 2023 WL 7401495, at *4; see Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 33.004(a). Here, BD Trucking and Odigie filed their motion for leave to designate Halliburton as a responsible third party on June 10, 2025. The docket control order set the case for trial on September 2, 2025. Thus, BD Trucking and Odigie filed the motion more than 60 days before the trial setting. As such, BD Trucking and Odigie’s motion was timely under section 33.004(a).
Statute of limitations Section 33.004(d) provides that “a defendant may not designate a person as a responsible third party with respect to a claimant’s cause of action after the applicable limitations period on the cause of action has expired with respect to the responsible third party” unless the possible designation was timely disclosed. YRC Inc., 646 S.W.3d at 808; see Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 33.004(d). However, here, there is no “applicable limitations period on th[is] cause of action … with respect to” third party Halliburton because the Legislature has eliminated the cause of action by statute. See YRC Inc., 646 S.W.3d at 808. Halliburton is a “subscriber to workers’ compensation insurance,” and Vargas’ “negligence cause of action seeks recovery for work-related injury.” See id. As a matter of law, therefore, recovery of workers’ compensation is Vargas’ exclusive remedy against Halliburton. See id.; see also Tex. Lab. Code § 408.001(a) (“Recovery of workers’ compensation benefits is the exclusive remedy of an employee … against the employer … for the death of or a work-related injury sustained by the employee.”). And Vargas has already exercised his exclusive remedy against Halliburton via his workers’ compensation claim. See YRC Inc., 646 S.W.3d at 809. Thus, section 33.004(d) does not prohibit Halliburton’s designation as a responsible third party.
Sufficient facts Section 33.004(g) provides that “if an objection to the motion for leave is timely filed, the court shall grant leave to designate the person as a responsible third party unless the objecting party establishes” both that “the defendant did not plead sufficient facts concerning the alleged responsibility of the person to satisfy the pleading requirement of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure” and that, “after having been granted leave to replead, the defendant failed to plead sufficient facts” again. YRC Inc., 646 S.W.3d at 809; see Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 33.004(g)(1), (2). The Rules of Civil Procedure require “a short statement of the cause of action sufficient to give fair notice of the claim involved.” YRC Inc., 646 S.W.3d at 809; see Tex. R. Civ. P. 47(a). To plead sufficient facts on a motion for leave to designate a responsible third party under section 30.004, a movant must satisfy only this fair-notice requirement. YRC Inc., 646 S.W.3d at 809. So long as a party can ascertain from the pleading the nature, basic issues, and type of evidence that might be relevant to the controversy, a pleading satisfies the Rule 47(a) standard. YRC Inc., 646 S.W.3d at 809-10.
*3 Here, Vargas timely filed an objection to the motion for leave to designate Halliburton as a responsible third party. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 33.004(f). However, BD Trucking and Odigie pled sufficient facts in the motion to designate Halliburton as a responsible third party because the motion states Halliburton was “in control of the area” where the incident occurred and “failed to take proper measures.” They allege that Halliburton owed Vargas a duty “to perform their scope of work in accordance with industry standards, in a good and workmanlike manner, and with a reasonable degree of care,” and breached these duties, causing Vargas’ injuries. They allege Halliburton’s conduct — including its failure to train Vargas, and failing to give notice that its policies and procedures had changed three to four months before the accident — contributed to Vargas’ injuries.
Thus, the motion provides fair notice to Vargas of the nature of the controversy, its basic issues, and the type of evidence that might be relevant to Halliburton’s responsibility for his injuries. See YRC Inc., 646 S.W.3d at 810. Thus, BD Trucking and Odigie’s motion satisfied the requirements of Rule 47(a) and section 33.004(g)(1). As such, section 33.004(g)(1) does not bar Halliburton’s designation as a responsible third party.
Consequently, the trial court abused its discretion in denying BD Trucking and Odigie’s motion to designate Halliburton as a responsible third party. Further, there is ordinarily no adequate remedy by appeal from the erroneous denial of a timely filed motion to designate a responsible third party. YRC Inc., 646 S.W.3d at 810. Allowing a case to proceed to trial without the third party would defeat the defendant’s right to have the jury determine the proportionate responsibility of all potential responsible parties, requiring a second trial. See id. Thus, BD Trucking and Odigie lack an adequate remedy by appeal.
Conclusion
We conclude the trial court abused its discretion when it denied BD Trucking and Odigie’s motion for leave to designate Halliburton as a responsible third party. Consequently, BD Trucking and Odigie lack an adequate remedy by appeal. Thus, we conditionally grant the petition for writ of mandamus, and order the trial court to vacate its August 19, 2025 order denying BD Trucking and Odigie’s motion for leave to designate Halliburton as a responsible third party and to grant the motion. We are confident the trial court will act in accordance with this opinion and a writ will issue only if the trial court fails to comply. Finally, we lift this court’s stay.