Title: 

APD 001250

Significant Decision

Date: 

July 14, 2000

Issues: 

Disabilty/Existence-Duration, Existence of Compensable Inj

Table of Contents

APD 001250

This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 et seq. (1989 Act). A contested case hearing was held on May 3, 2000. The hearing officer determined that on __________, the appellant (claimant) did not sustain a compensable injury and that the claimant has not had disability. The claimant appeals, contending these determinations are contrary to the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. The respondent (carrier) replies that there is sufficient evidence to support the decision of the hearing officer.

DECISION

Finding sufficient evidence to support the decision of the hearing officer and no reversible error in the record, we affirm the decision and order of the hearing officer.

It was undisputed that claimant was involved in a motor vehicle accident in the course and scope of her employment on __________. The claimant testified that she suffered a cervical injury in this accident and her treating doctor stated that she suffered an injury.

The question of whether an injury occurred is one of fact. Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 93854, decided November 9, 1993; Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 93449, decided July 21, 1993. Section 410.165(a) provides that the hearing officer, as finder of fact, is the sole judge of the relevance and materiality of the evidence as well as of the weight and credibility that is to be given the evidence. It was for the hearing officer, as trier of fact, to resolve the inconsistencies and conflicts in the evidence. Garza v. Commercial Insurance Company of Newark, New Jersey, 508 S.W.2d 701, 702 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, no writ). This is equally true regarding medical evidence. Texas Employers Insurance Association v. Campos, 666 S.W.2d 286, 290 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ). The trier of fact may believe all, part, or none of the testimony of any witness. Taylor v. Lewis, 553 S.W.2d 153, 161 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1977, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Aetna Insurance Co. v. English, 204 S.W.2d 850 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1947, no writ). An appeals level body is not a fact finder and does not normally pass upon the credibility of witnesses or substitute its own judgment for that of the trier of fact, even if the evidence would support a different result. National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania v. Soto, 819 S.W.2d 619, 620 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1991, writ denied). When reviewing a hearing officer’s decision for factual sufficiency of the evidence we should reverse such decision only if it is so contrary to the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust. Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986); Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tex. 1986).

A finding of injury may be based upon the testimony of the claimant alone. Houston Independent School District v. Harrison, 744 S.W.2d 298, 299 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, no writ). However, as an interested party, the claimant’s testimony only raises an issue of fact for the hearing officer to resolve. Escamilla v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, 499 S.W.2d 758 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1973, no writ). In the present case, the hearing officer found no injury contrary to the testimony of the claimant supported by medical evidence. The claimant had the burden to prove she was injured in the course and scope of her employment. Reed v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 535 S.W.2d 377 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1976, writ ref’d n.r.e.). We cannot say that the hearing officer was incorrect as a matter of law in finding that the claimant failed to meet this burden. This is so even though another fact finder might have drawn other inferences and reached other conclusions. Salazar v. Hill, 551 S.W.2d 518 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1977, writ ref’d n.r.e.). We have also, on numerous occasions, held that the Appeals Panel should not set aside the decision of a hearing officer because the hearing officer may have drawn inferences and conclusions different than those the Appeals Panel deems most reasonable, even though the record contains evidence of inconsistent inferences. Garza, supra; Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 93334, decided June 14, 1993; Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 93053, decided March 1, 1993; Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 92539, decided November 25, 1992.

The decision and order of the hearing officer are affirmed.

Gary L. Kilgore – Appeals Judge

CONCUR:

Tommy W. Lueders – Appeals Judge

Dorian E. Ramirez – Appeals Judge