This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 et seq. (1989 Act). A contested case hearing was held on May 5, 2000. With respect to the single issue before her, the hearing officer determined that the appellant’s (claimant) compensable injury of __________, does not extend to bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome (CTS). In her appeal, the claimant essentially argues that the hearing officer’s extent-of-injury determination is against the great weight of the evidence. In its response to the claimant’s appeal, the respondent (carrier) contends that the claimant’s appeal does not meet the minimum requirements for an appeal under Section 410.202(c) and Tex. W.C. Comm’n, 28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 143.3(a) (Rule 143.3(a)). In the alternative, the carrier urges affirmance.
DECISION
Affirmed.
Initially, we will consider the carrier’s assertion that the claimant’s appeal did not meet the statutory and rule requirements to serve as an appeal. While the claimant’s appeal is admittedly abbreviated, we cannot agree that it is insufficient to invoke our jurisdiction. Section 410.202(c) provides that “[a] request for appeal or a response must clearly and concisely rebut or support the decision of the hearing officer on each issue on which review is sought.” The Appeals Panel has read this requirement broadly, particularly in cases involving an unrepresented claimant where it is relatively apparent what issue the claimant is appealing. Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 000204, decided March 15, 2000. In this instance, there was only one issue before the hearing officer and as such we will interpret the claimant’s appeal as a sufficiency challenge to the hearing officer’s extent-of-injury determination.
The parties stipulated that the claimant sustained a compensable injury to her back, neck, right wrist, and left ankle on __________. The claimant testified that on that date she was working as a mortgage collector for the employer; that she was walking down a flight of stairs; and that she tripped and fell, hitting her head, back and hands on the concrete stairs. The record reflects that the claimant saw numerous doctors in the years following her compensable injury. She testified that she continuously complained about numbness and tingling in her hands to her doctors; however, she stated that they continued to focus her treatment on her neck and back. A diagnosis of bilateral CTS is not reflected in the claimant’s medical records until December 1, 1998, in the records of Dr. K. In that report, Dr. K opines that the claimant’s bilateral CTS is “injury related.” Dr. B confirmed the diagnosis of bilateral CTS on February 1, 2000, and reported a history of the claimant’s having sustained a compensable injury on __________. On cross-examination, the claimant testified that in the period from __________, to 1996 or 1997, she worked about 75% of the time that a full-time employee would have worked.
The claimant was sent by the Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission to Dr. S for a required medical examination. In a report dated March 20, 1998, Dr. S noted that Dr. K had diagnosed bilateral CTS and stated that the bilateral CTS diagnosis is “not supported by the objective testing that has already been done.”
The claimant has the burden to prove the nature and extent of her compensable injury. Johnson v. Employers Reinsurance Corp., 351 S.W.2d 936 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1961, no writ). The question of whether the claimant’s compensable injury extends to bilateral CTS presented the hearing officer with a question of fact. The hearing officer is the sole judge of the relevance, materiality, weight, and credibility of the evidence before him. Section 410.165. The hearing officer resolves conflicts and inconsistencies in the evidence and determines what facts have been established. Texas Employers Ins. Ass’n v. Campos, 666 S.W.2d 286 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ). To that end, the hearing officer may believe all, part, or none of the testimony of any witness. An appeals level body is not a fact finder and it does not normally pass upon the credibility of the witnesses or substitute its judgment for that of the trier of fact, even if the evidence would support a different result. National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Soto, 819 S.W.2d 619 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1991, writ denied).
In this instance, the hearing officer determined that the claimant did not sustain her burden of proving that her compensable injury extends to bilateral CTS. In her discussion, the hearing officer stated that the claimant “failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence, particularly medical evidence, that her compensable injury of __________, extends to bilateral [CTS].” The hearing officer noted that the claimant saw numerous doctors in the period from 1992 to 1998 and emphasized the fact that bilateral CTS was not mentioned in the medical records until December 1998. That factor was properly considered by the hearing officer in making her credibility determinations. Our review of the record does not reveal that the hearing officer’s extent-of-injury determination is so against the great weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong or manifestly unjust. Accordingly, no sound basis exists for us to reverse the determination that the compensable injury does not extend to bilateral CTS on appeal. Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tex. 1986); Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986).
The hearing officer’s decision and order are affirmed.
Elaine M. Chaney – Appeals Judge
CONCUR:
Tommy W. Lueders – Appeals Judge
Robert W. Potts – Appeals Judge