This appeal is brought pursuant to the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 et seq. (1989 Act). A contested case hearing was held on July 25, 2000. The appellant (claimant) and the respondent (carrier) stipulated that the qualifying period for the third quarter for supplemental income benefits (SIBs) began on December 3, 1999, and continued through March 2, 2000, and that the qualifying period for the fourth quarter for SIBs began on March 3, 2000, and continued through June 1, 2000. The claimant did not seek employment during the qualifying periods and contended that he is entitled to SIBs for the third and fourth quarters because he had no ability to work during the qualifying periods. The hearing officer found that during the qualifying periods the claimant’s unemployment was a direct result of his impairment from the compensable injury, that he had some ability to work, and that he did not make a good faith effort to obtain employment commensurate with his ability to work and concluded that the claimant is not entitled to SIBs for the third and fourth quarters. The claimant appealed, stated evidence that he said supports his contention that he had no ability to work during the qualifying periods, and requested that the Appeals Panel reverse the decision of the hearing officer and render a decision that he is entitled to SIBs for the third and fourth quarters. The carrier responded, urged that the evidence is sufficient to support the decision of the hearing officer, and requested that it be affirmed. The findings that during the qualifying periods the claimant’s unemployment was a direct result of his impairment from the compensable injury have not been appealed and have become final under the provisions of Section 410.169.
DECISION
We affirm.
Tex. W.C. Comm’n, 28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 130.102 (Rule 130.102) addresses eligibility for SIBs. Rule 130.102(d) provides in part:
Good Faith Effort. An injured employee has made a good faith effort to obtain employment commensurate with the employee’s ability to work if the employee:
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(4) has been unable to perform any type of work in any capacity, has provided a narrative report from a doctor which specifically explains how the injury causes a total inability to work, and no other records show that the injured employee is able to return to work; or [.]
The Decision and Order of the hearing officer contains a statement of the evidence that includes summaries of the testimony of the claimant, reports of doctors who treated the claimant, and a report of a functional capacity evaluation (FCE). Briefly, the report of a pain specialist treating the claimant said that the claimant had severe, excruciating, and intractable pain; that he recommended that the claimant not return to work “as with any minimal activity, he has worsening pain, and his pain has progressively worsened partly due to the fact that all aggressive treatments have been denied;” that the claimant continues with narcotic and nonnarcotic medications; that he, the doctor, does not feel that the claimant should be returning to work as the amount of medications he is taking may interfere with his job, possibly endangering him or endangering people around him; and that he had not released the claimant to return to work.
At the request of the carrier, an FCE was performed. A report of an FCE dated August 23, 1999, and signed by a chiropractor states that the claimant walked on a treadmill for 10 minutes at 2.2 miles per hour, with complaints of numbness down both legs; that he was able to sit at 45-minute intervals without substantial increase in pain if he is allowed to stand and walk at 45-minute intervals; that he can stand for about one hour, although he needs the ability to walk and not stand in one place for extended times; that he should not lift over 10 pounds above the shoulder; that he should not carry over 20 pounds; that his prognosis was good; and that he should be limited to sedentary type work. The chiropractor was provided a copy of a videotape of the claimant taken on April 11, 2000. In a letter dated May 30, 2000, he reviewed the videotape and opined that it showed that the claimant had the ability to work in a sedentary capacity, but that it did not show any evidence that the claimant’s work capacity should be increased from sedentary.
The hearing officer is the trier of fact and is the sole judge of the relevance and materiality of the evidence and of the weight and credibility to be given to the evidence. Section 410.165(a). The trier of fact may believe all, part, or none of any witness’s testimony because the finder of fact judges the credibility of each and every witness, determines the weight to assign to each witness’s testimony, and resolves conflicts and inconsistencies in the evidence. Taylor v. Lewis, 553 S.W.2d 153 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1977, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 93426, decided July 5, 1993. This is equally true regarding medical evidence. Texas Employers Insurance Association v. Campos, 666 S.W.2d 286 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ). An appeals level body is not a fact finder, and it does not normally pass upon the credibility of witnesses or substitute its own judgment for that of the trier of fact even if the evidence would support a different result. National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania v. Soto, 819 S.W.2d 619, 620 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1991, writ denied). The hearing officer determined that during the qualifying periods the claimant “had some ability to work” and “did not make a good faith effort to obtain employment commensurate with his ability to work.” Those determinations are not so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be clearly wrong or unjust and there is not a sound basis to disturb them. In re King’s Estate, 150 Tex. 662, 244 S.W.2d 660 (1951); Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tex. 1986). It would have been preferable for the hearing officer to have made determinations on whether a narrative report from a doctor explains how the injury causes a total inability to work and whether other records show that the claimant was able to return to work during the qualifying periods. Under the circumstances of the case before us, we are not required to reverse the hearing officer’s decision and remand for her to make additional factual determinations.
We affirm the decision and the order of the hearing officer.
Tommy W. Lueders – Appeals Judge
CONCUR:
Kathleen C. Decker – Appeals Judge
Philip F. O’Neill – Appeals Judge