This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 et seq. (1989 Act). A contested case hearing was held on August 23, 2000. With respect to the issues before her, the hearing officer determined that the respondent (claimant) sustained a compensable injury in the form of an occupational disease with a date of injury of __________, and that the claimant had disability as a result of her compensable injury from January 10, 2000, through the date of the hearing. In its appeal, the appellant (carrier) argues that those determinations are against the great weight of the evidence. In her response to the carrier’s appeal, the claimant urges affirmance. The parties resolved an issue as to the claimant’s average weekly wage by stipulating that it is $535.00.
DECISION
Affirmed.
The claimant testified that she began working for the employer on May 4, 1998, as an assistant property manager and that she subsequently became a property manager at an apartment complex. The claimant stated that she spent about four hours each day doing computer keyboard work and signing documents. She stated that for the rest of the day she performed other duties which occasionally required her to use a ten-key machine and a calculator. The claimant testified that in late October 1999, she developed numbness in her right hand and was not able to feel her fingers. She stated that the numbness was accompanied by pain that went up her right arm and into her right shoulder. On __________, the claimant had an appointment with Dr. D about the problems in her right hand/arm. In progress notes of that date, Dr. D diagnosed carpal tunnel syndrome (CTS) and placed the claimant in an off-work status. The claimant stated that she continued to work after __________, until her employment was terminated by the employer on January 9, 2000, for misuse of petty cash. The claimant stated that in the period after she treated with Dr. D, her assistant manager, Ms. B, performed the duties the claimant had previously performed that required the use of her right hand.
In a report dated April 10, 2000, Dr. D stated that he “strongly suspects” that the claimant has CTS and a possible right elbow injury; that he has referred the claimant to Dr. F, an orthopedic surgeon; and that the claimant “continues to be off work for her injury until she can be evaluated and tested . . . .” In a May 25, 2000, report, Dr. D states that the claimant is being treated for CTS and that within reasonable medical probability the claimant’s injury was caused by the repetitive hand activities she performed at work. Finally, Dr. D stated that the claimant “has been unable to work since her injury because of the pain and weakness in her hands.”
Ms. B testified that in the period from early November 1999 until the date the claimant’s employment was terminated, the claimant was not able to use her right hand to perform her duties. Ms. B maintained, as had the claimant, that Ms. B performed the duties for the claimant that required the use of the claimant’s right hand/arm.
Ms. S testified that she was an office manager for the employer from June 1999 to February 2000. Ms. S stated that in late 1999, she had a conversation with the claimant in which the claimant told her that she was having problems with her right wrist and was going to the doctor. Ms. S testified that she specifically asked the claimant if her injury was work related and the claimant responded that it was not. Ms. S stated that after that conversation, she received a telephone call from Dr. D’s office asking for information concerning the employer’s workers’ compensation carrier. Ms. S stated that she provided that information to the doctor’s office despite the fact that she was not aware that the claimant was alleging a work-related injury at that time. Ms. S stated that after her conversation with Dr. D’s office she contacted the claimant and the claimant specifically denied that her injury was work related. Ms. S maintained that she did not learn that the claimant was alleging an on-the-job injury until after the claimant’s employment was terminated.
Ms. PB testified that she is a general manager with the employer and that she was the claimant’s supervisor. Ms. PB stated that in late October 1999 she had a conversation with the claimant about her arm hurting and that she advised the claimant to go to the doctor. Ms. PB maintained that the claimant did not tell her that her injury was work related; rather, the claimant advised Ms. PB that she was going to use her group health insurance and that she had to delay her appointment until after she was paid so that she would have the money for the co-pay.
The claimant had the burden to prove that she sustained a compensable injury in the form of an occupational disease from performing repetitively traumatic activities at work. Johnson v. Employers Reinsurance Corp., 351 S.W.2d 936 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1961, no writ). That issue presented a question of fact for the hearing officer to resolve. The hearing officer is the sole judge of the relevance and materiality of the evidence and of its weight and credibility. Section 410.165(a). The hearing officer resolves conflicts and inconsistencies in the evidence, decides what weight to give to the evidence, and determines what facts the evidence has established. Texas Employers Ins. Ass’n v. Campos, 666 S.W.2d 286 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ). To this end, the hearing officer as fact finder may believe all, part, or none of the testimony of any witness. When reviewing a hearing officer’s decision we will reverse such decision only if it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and manifestly unjust. Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tex. 1986); Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986).
On appeal, the carrier contends that the hearing officer’s determination that the claimant sustained a compensable injury is against the great weight of the evidence, emphasizing the factors it believes diminish the credibility of the claimant’s testimony and the other evidence offered in support of her claim. The carrier emphasized the same factors at the hearing, and the significance, or lack thereof, of those factors was a matter left to the discretion of the hearing officer. The hearing officer’s determinations that the claimant sustained a compensable injury is sufficiently supported by the claimant’s testimony and the medical evidence from Dr. D. Our review of the record does not demonstrate that the hearing officer’s injury determination is so against the great weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong or manifestly unjust; therefore, no sound basis exists for us to reverse that determination on appeal. Pool; Cain.
The carrier’s primary challenge to the hearing officer’s disability determination is premised upon the success of its argument that the claimant did not sustain a compensable injury. However, the carrier also argues that the evidence does not support a finding of disability because the claimant continued to work from November 1999 to January 2000, when her employment was terminated for cause. The claimant testified that she was only able to continue working because Ms. B performed the duties that required the use of her right hand and arm. That evidence and the evidence from Dr. D support the hearing officer’s determination that the claimant had disability from January 10, 2000, through the date of the hearing. Nothing in our review of the record demonstrates that the hearing officer’s disability determination is so contrary to the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to compel its reversal.
The hearing officer’s decision and order are affirmed.
Elaine M. Chaney – Appeals Judge
CONCUR:
Gary L. Kilgore – Appeals Judge
Robert W. Potts – Appeals Judge