This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 et seq. (1989 Act). A contested case hearing was held on September 22, 2000. With respect to the single issue before her, the hearing officer determined that the appellant’s (claimant) compensable injury of _________, does not extend to anxiety and depression. In his appeal, the claimant argues that that determination is against the great weight of the evidence. In its response to the claimant’s appeal, the respondent (carrier) urges affirmance. At the hearing, the parties agreed to withdraw issues of whether the claimant had reached maximum medical improvement and whether he had disability.
DECISION
Affirmed.
The parties stipulated that the claimant sustained a compensable injury on _________, when he was exposed to hydrogen sulfide in the course and scope of his employment in the employer’s wastewater treatment plant. The claimant contends that his exposure caused him to develop anxiety and depression, which he asserts are part of the compensable injury. As the hearing officer noted, the medical evidence from Dr. C and Dr. P, the doctors who treated the claimant, do not include a diagnosis of depression. The records from Dr. C and Dr. P mention anxiety and stress in relation to difficulty the claimant had in attempting to return to work with the employer following his compensable injury. In addition, there was significant evidence concerning other stressors in the claimant’s life, including marital difficulties, an alcoholic spouse, a chronic bacterial infection of the stomach, and chronic pain from a back injury. In addition, the claimant acknowledged on cross-examination that he had suffered from depression and sought treatment for depression prior to his compensable injury.
The claimant had the burden to prove that his compensable injury extended to anxiety and depression. Johnson v. Employers Reinsurance Corp., 351 S.W.2d 936 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1961, no writ). That question presented a question of fact for the hearing officer to resolve. The hearing officer is the sole judge of the relevance and materiality of the evidence and of its weight and credibility. Section 410.165(a). The hearing officer resolves conflicts and inconsistencies in the evidence and decides what facts have been established. Texas Employers Ins. Ass’n v. Campos, 666 S.W.2d 286 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ). To this end, the hearing officer as fact finder may believe all, part, or none of the testimony of any witness. When reviewing a hearing officer’s decision we will reverse such decision only if it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and manifestly unjust. Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tex. 1986); Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986).
In this instance, the hearing officer determined that the claimant did not sustain his burden of proving the causal connection between his compensable injury and anxiety and depression. The hearing officer simply was not persuaded that the evidence presented by the claimant was sufficient to establish that causal relationship. Specifically, she noted that “[t]here was little to support that Claimant’s depression and anxiety were related to the toxic exposure at work.” The hearing officer was acting within her province as the fact finder in so finding. Our review of the record does not demonstrate that the hearing officer’s extent-of-injury determination is so against the great weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong or manifestly unjust; therefore, no sound basis exists for us to reverse that determination on appeal. Pool; Cain.
The hearing officer’s decision and order are affirmed.
Elaine M. Chaney – Appeals Judge
CONCUR:
Susan M. Kelley – Appeals Judge
Gary L. Kilgore – Appeals Judge