Following a contested case hearing (CCH) held on October 23, 2000, pursuant to the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 et seq. (1989 Act), the hearing officer resolved the disputed issues by determining that the respondent/cross-appellant’s (claimant herein) compensable injury extended to her low back and that the appellant/cross-respondent (carrier herein) did not waive the compensability of the claimant’s low back. The carrier files a request for review arguing that the hearing officer’s resolution of the extent-of-injury question was contrary to the evidence. The claimant responds that the hearing officer’s resolution of this issue was sufficiently supported by the evidence. The claimant appeals the hearing officer’s determination that the carrier did not waive the right to contest compensability of the claimant’s low back injury. There is no response from the carrier to the claimant’s request for review in the appeal file.
DECISION
Finding sufficient evidence to support the decision of the hearing officer and no reversible error in the record, we affirm the decision and order of the hearing officer.
The parties stipulated that the claimant sustained a compensable injury to her right knee on __________. The claimant testified that she was injured while working when the chair in which was seated tipped and she fell forward. The claimant testified that as a result of this injury she felt pain in her back all the way down to her right knee. Medical records were admitted into evidence. Some of these medical records mention an injury to the claimant’s low back and some do not.
We have held that the question of the extent of an injury is a question of fact for the hearing officer. Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 93613, decided August 24, 1993. Section 410.165(a) provides that the hearing officer, as finder of fact, is the sole judge of the relevance and materiality of the evidence as well as of the weight and credibility that is to be given the evidence. It was for the hearing officer, as trier of fact, to resolve the inconsistencies and conflicts in the evidence. Garza v. Commercial Insurance Company of Newark, New Jersey, 508 S.W.2d 701, 702 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, no writ). This is equally true regarding medical evidence. Texas Employers Insurance Association v. Campos, 666 S.W.2d 286, 290 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ). The trier of fact may believe all, part, or none of the testimony of any witness. Taylor v. Lewis, 553 S.W.2d 153, 161 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1977, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Aetna Insurance Co. v. English, 204 S.W.2d 850 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1947, no writ). An appeals-level body is not a fact finder and does not normally pass upon the credibility of witnesses or substitute its own judgment for that of the trier of fact, even if the evidence would support a different result. National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania v. Soto, 819 S.W.2d 619, 620 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1991, writ denied). When reviewing a hearing officer’s decision for factual sufficiency of the evidence we should reverse such decision only if it is so contrary to the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust. Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986); Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tex. 1986).
Applying this standard of review, we do not find that the great weight and preponderance of the evidence was contrary to the finding of the hearing officer that the claimant’s injury extended to her low back. In the present case, we do not find that the hearing officer failed to apply the correct legal standard or that the great weight and preponderance of the evidence is contrary to his factual determinations. Generally corroboration of an injury is not required and may be found based upon a claimant’s testimony alone. Houston Independent School District v. Harrison, 744 S.W.2d 298, 299 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, no writ). Here, an injury to the claimant’s low back is supported by the testimony of the claimant and some of the medical evidence.
On the waiver issue, Tex. W.C. Comm’n, 28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 124.3(c) (Rule 124.3(c), effective March 13, 2000, provides that Section 409.021 and the implementing provisions of this statute in Rule 124.3(a) “do not apply to disputes of extent of injury.” We have held that Rule 124.3 is applicable in those cases in which a CCH is convened on or after March 13, 2000, to address a disputed issue of carrier waiver in the context of an extent-of-injury question because it precludes the Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission from imposing a waiver after that date. The CCH, in this case, was convened on October 23, 2000. Therefore, the hearing officer properly did not find carrier waiver of the extent of the claimant’s injury.
The decision and order of the hearing officer are affirmed.
Gary L. Kilgore – Appeals Judge
CONCUR:
Thomas A. Knapp – Appeals Judge
Robert W. Potts – Appeals Judge