This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 et seq. (1989 Act). A contested case hearing was held on June 8, 2001. The hearing officer resolved the disputed issues by determining the following:
1.The respondent (claimant) did sustain a compensable injury on __________; and
2.The claimant sustained disability from October 29, 2000, through January 4, 2001, as a result of the compensable injury of __________.
The appellant (self-insured employer) filed a request for review disputing the hearing officer’s determinations regarding compensability and disability. The claimant urges affirmance.
DECISION
Affirmed.
The evidence sufficiently supports the hearing officer’s determinations that the claimant sustained a compensable injury on __________, and had disability from October 29, 2000, through January 4, 2001. Section 401.011(10) provides that a compensable injury is an injury which arises out of and in the course and scope of employment for which compensation is payable. Section 401.011(16) provides that disability is the inability because of a compensable injury to obtain and retain employment at wages equivalent to the preinjury wage. The hearing officer was persuaded by the claimant’s testimony and the medical records in evidence that the claimant sustained a work-related injury on October 28, 2000, as he claimed.
The hearing officer, as finder of fact, is the sole judge of the relevance and materiality of the evidence as well as the weight and credibility that is to be given the evidence. Section 410.165(a). It was for the hearing officer, as trier of fact, to resolve the inconsistencies and conflicts in the evidence. Garza v. Commercial Insurance Company of Newark, New Jersey, 508 S.W.2d 701 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, no writ). This is equally true regarding medical evidence. Texas Employers Insurance Association v. Campos, 666 S.W.2d 286 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ). We will reverse a factual determination of a hearing officer only if that determination is so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and manifestly unjust. Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986); Pool v. Ford Motor Company, 715 S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tex. 1986). Applying this standard of review to the record of this case, we decline to substitute our opinion of the evidence for that of the hearing officer.
The decision and order of the hearing officer are affirmed.
Michael B. McShane – Appeals Judge
CONCUR:
Gary L. Kilgore – Appeals Judge
Robert W. Potts – Appeals Judge