This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 et seq. (1989 Act). This decision was reconsidered after remand from the Appeals Panel in Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 010802, decided May 31, 2001. In the present decision, the hearing officer, determined that the appellant (claimant) did not have disability for the period from October 7, 1997, through the date of maximum medical improvement, which was stipulated to be March 26, 1998.
The claimant appeals, asserting that the hearing officer ignored “uncontroverted evidence” of his disability and that he was deprived of submitting medical evidence because the respondent (carrier) did not pay for his medical treatment. The carrier responds that the decision should be affirmed.
DECISION
We affirm the hearing officer’s decision.
The hearing officer did not err in determining that the claimant did not have disability during the period of time in question. At the hearing on remand, the claimant was present but did not testify. The parties proceeded to argument after submitting a few exhibits.
First of all, it is the primary burden of a claimant to establish disability. A trier of fact may choose to disbelieve witness testimony, even if uncontroverted (and we cannot agree that in this case there was no evidence against the claimant’s contention). Second, given that the claimant had income from unemployment benefits during the period in question, we cannot agree that he did not have the means to obtain medical opinions and treatment even if the carrier did not, as alleged, pay for same, and could therefore be said to have been deprived of favorable medical evidence through the unilateral efforts of the carrier. Finally, the claimant should have been readily able to produce evidence relating to a way to value his in-kind payment for employment or the date he began such employment. This is especially true as the importance of the value of such in-kind remuneration was expressly commented upon by the Appeals Panel in its initial decision.
An appeals-level body is not a fact finder and does not normally pass upon the credibility of witnesses or substitute its own judgment for that of the trier of fact, even if the evidence would support a different result. National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania v. Soto, 819 S.W.2d 619, 620 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1991, writ denied); American Motorists Insurance Co. v. Volentine, 867 S.W.2d 170 (Tex. App.- Beaumont 1993, no writ). The decision of the hearing officer will be set aside only if the evidence supporting the hearing officer’s determination is so weak or against the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong or manifestly unjust. Atlantic Mutual Insurance Company v. Middleman, 661 S.W.2d 182 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1983, writ ref’d n.r.e.). We cannot agree that this was the case here, and affirm the decision and order.
The true corporate name of the insurance carrier is CENTRE INSURANCE COMPANY and the name and address of its registered agent for service of process is
CORPORATION SERVICE COMPANY
800 BRAZOS STREET
AUSTIN, TEXAS 78701.
Susan M. Kelley – Appeals Judge
CONCUR:
Philip F. O’Neill – Appeals Judge
Robert W. Potts – Appeals Judge