This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 et seq. (1989 Act). A contested case hearing was held on August 6, 2001. The hearing officer determined that (1) the respondent (claimant) sustained a compensable repetitive trauma injury on or about ________, and (2) the appellant (self-insured) is not relieved from liability for the compensable injury, pursuant to Section 409.002, because the claimant timely notified his employer of the injury pursuant to Section 409.001. The self-insured appealed the hearing officer’s determinations, asserting that there is no evidence of work-related, repetitive physical trauma to the claimant’s shoulders; that the claimant’s condition is an ordinary disease of life; and that the great weight of the credible evidence establishes that the claimant did not give timely notice of his injury. The claimant urges affirmance.
DECISION
Affirmed.
COMPENSABLE INJURY
The hearing officer did not err in determining that the claimant sustained a compensable repetitive trauma injury on or about ________. The claimant had the burden to prove that he suffered damage or harm to the physical structure of the body occurring as a result of repetitious, physically traumatic activities that occurred over time and arose out of and in the course and scope of his employment. See Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 992486, decided December 29, 1999; Sections 401.011(34) and (36). Whether the claimant sustained a compensable repetitive trauma injury was a question of fact for the hearing officer to resolve. Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 010747, decided May 14, 2001. The hearing officer is the sole judge of the weight and credibility of the evidence (Section 410.165(a)) and, as the trier of fact, resolves the conflicts and inconsistencies in the evidence, including the medical evidence (Texas Employers Insurance Association v. Campos, 666 S.W.2d 286 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ)). In view of the evidence presented, we cannot conclude that the hearing officer’s decision is so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be clearly wrong or manifestly unjust. Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986).
NOTICE OF INJURY
The hearing officer did not err in determining that the self-insured is not relieved from liability for the compensable injury, pursuant to Section 409.002. Section 409.001(a)(2) provides, in relevant part, that an employee or a person acting on the employee’s behalf shall notify the employer of an injury not later than the 30th day after the date on which the employee knew or should have known that the injury may be related to the employment. Failure to notify an employer as required by Section 409.001(a) relieves the employer and the self-insured of liability, unless the employer or the self-insured has actual knowledge of the injury, good cause exists, or the claim is not contested. Section 409.002.
Whether the claimant timely notified his employer of the claimed injury was a question of fact for the hearing officer. Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 990301, decided March 31, 1999 (Unpublished). In view of the claimant’s testimony and written statements of the claimant’s former coworkers, the hearing officer could conclude that the claimant notified his employer of the injury on March 16, 2000. The hearing officer’s determination is not so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be clearly wrong or manifestly unjust. Cain, supra.
The decision and order of the hearing officer are affirmed.
The true corporate name of the insurance carrier is STATE OFFICE OF RISK MANAGEMENT and the name and address of its registered agent for service of process is
RON JOSSELET
300 WEST 15TH STREET, 6TH FLOOR
AUSTIN, TEXAS 78711.
Gary L. Kilgore – Appeals Judge
CONCUR:
Elaine M. Chaney – Appeals Judge
Michael B. McShane – Appeals Judge