This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 et seq. (1989 Act). A contested case hearing (CCH) was held on August 29, 2001. The hearing officer determined that the respondent/cross-appellant (claimant) sustained a compensable injury in the form of an occupational disease (bilateral upper extremity injuries), with a date of injury of ____________, and that the claimant had disability beginning ____________, and continuing (apparently through the date of the CCH). The appellant-cross/respondent has appealed the determinations that there is a compensable injury and disability on sufficiency of the evidence grounds. The claimant submitted an untimely cross-appeal, disputing the hearing officer’s finding in that it does not list the claimant’s neck as part of the compensable injury. We note first that although the claimant sought to change the issue reported out of the benefit review conference to include specific body parts, the hearing officer refused to do so, and then went on to make a general finding that there is a compensable injury. There is absolutely no support in the record for the claimant’s position in this regard. Further, the cross-appeal was untimely, apparently because it was misaddressed. Despite a request that we consider the cross-appeal anyway, we are not permitted to do so. The carrier apparently received its copy of the cross-appeal in a timely manner, and has submitted a response, but we will not consider the response to an untimely appeal.
DECISION
Finding the evidence sufficient to support the determinations of the hearing officer that the claimant sustained a compensable injury and has disability, we affirm.
The issues in this case involved factual determinations for the hearing officer. Section 410.165(a) provides that the hearing officer, as finder of fact, is the sole judge of the relevance and materiality of the evidence as well as the weight and credibility that is to be given the evidence. It was for the hearing officer, as trier of fact, to resolve the inconsistencies and conflicts in the evidence. Garza v. Commercial Insurance Company of Newark, New Jersey, 508 S.W.2d 701 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, no writ). This is equally true regarding medical evidence. Texas Employers Insurance Association v. Campos, 666 S.W.2d 286 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ). The trier of fact may believe all, part, or none of the testimony of any witness. Aetna Insurance Company v. English, 204 S.W.2d 850 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1947, no writ).
There is evidence in the record which shows that the claimant was engaged in repetitive work activity and medical evidence which indicates that she has bilateral upper extremity problems. The claimant testified that her job required repetitive activities and that her condition was work-related. The carrier presented conflicting evidence as to the nature of the work, as well as some evidence that the claimant knew she was about to be terminated for performance issues. In a case such as the one before us where both parties presented evidence on the disputed issues, the hearing officer must look at all of the relevant evidence to make factual determinations and the Appeals Panel must consider all of the relevant evidence to determine whether the factual determinations of the hearing officer are so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be clearly wrong or unjust. Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 941291, decided November 8, 1994. An appeals-level body is not a fact finder, and it does not normally pass upon the credibility of witnesses or substitute its own judgment for that of the trier of fact even if the evidence could support a different result. National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania v. Soto, 819 S.W.2d 619, 620 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1991, writ denied). Only were we to conclude, which we do not in this case, that the hearing officer’s determinations were so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be manifestly unjust would there be a sound basis to disturb those determinations. In re King’s Estate, 150 Tex. 662, 224 S.W.2d 660 (1951); Pool v. Ford Motor Company, 715 S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tex. 1986). Since we find the evidence sufficient to support the determinations of the hearing officer, we will not substitute our judgment for hers. Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 94044, decided February 17, 1994.
We affirm the decision and order of the hearing officer.
The true corporate name of the insurance carrier is LUMBERMENS’ MUTUAL CASUALTY COMPANY and the name and address of its registered agent for service of process is
CORPORATION SERVICE COMPANY
800 BRAZOS STREET
AUSTIN, TEXAS 78701.
Michael B. McShane – Appeals Judge
CONCUR:
Elaine M. Chaney – Appeals Judge
Robert W. Potts – Appeals Judge