This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 et seq. (1989 Act). A contested case hearing was held on September 18, 2001. She determined that the claimant was not entitled to supplemental income benefits for his fourth and fifth quarters of eligibility. The primary issue was whether the claimant had returned to work in a position that was relatively equal to his ability to work; she found that he had not.
The claimant has appealed, and he argues that his doctor has stated that he could work no more than four hours a day and that is the position he held during the filing periods.
DECISION
We affirm the hearing officer’s decision.
As applied to this case, 28 Tex. W.C. Comm’n TEX. ADMIN. CODE §130.102(d)(Rule 130.102(d)) defines good faith as follows:
Good Faith Effort. An injured employee has made a good faith effort to obtain employment commensurate with the employee’s ability to work if the employee:
(1)has returned to work in a position which is relatively equal to the injured employee’s ability to work.
The hearing officer did not err in determining that the claimant, for the filing periods under review, did not make a good faith search for employment. A functional capacity evaluation (FCE) placed the claimant at the restricted medium-duty level and the unrestricted light-duty level of work. The FCE did not state that there would be limits on the number of hours within a typical eight-hour workday. Against this was the statement of the treating doctor that the claimant was restricted to four hours a day, five days a week. The claimant also offered testimony about what he felt were his limits. In short, the evidence was conflicting.
An appeals-level body is not a fact finder, and does not normally pass upon the credibility of witnesses or substitute its own judgment for that of the trier of fact, even if the evidence would support a different result. National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania v. Soto, 819 S.W.2d 619, 620 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1991, writ denied); American Motorists Insurance Co. v. Volentine, 867 S.W.2d 170 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1993, no writ). The decision of the hearing officer will be set aside only if the evidence supporting the hearing officer’s determination is so weak or against the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong or manifestly unjust. Atlantic Mutual Insurance Company v. Middleman, 661 S.W.2d 182 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1983, writ ref’d n.r.e.). We do not agree that this was the case here, and affirm the decision and order.
The true corporate name of the insurance carrier is TEXAS MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY and the name and address of its registered agent for service of process is
RUSSELL R. OLIVER, PRESIDENT
221 WEST 6th STREET
AUSTIN, TEXAS 78701.
Susan M. Kelley – Appeals Judge
CONCUR:
Judy L. S. Barnes – Appeals Judge
Robert E. Lang
Appeals Panel
Manager/Judge