This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 et seq. (1989 Act). A contested case hearing (CCH) was held on September 28, 2001. The hearing officer determined that the respondent (claimant herein) suffered a compensable injury in the form of an occupational disease, that the claimant’s date of injury was ___________ [sic]; that the claimant timely reported his injury to the employer by reporting it on or before the 30th after day the date of the injury; that the appellant (carrier herein) waived its right to contest the compensability of the injury by failing to dispute compensability within 60 days of receiving notice of the injury; and that the claimant had disability continuing from March 3, 2000, continuing through the date of the CCH. The carrier appeals, contending the hearing officer’s resolution of the issues was contrary to the evidence. The claimant responds that the hearing officer’s determinations were supported by sufficient evidence.
DECISION
We reform the decision of the hearing officer to correct typographical errors as to dates. Finding sufficient evidence to support the decision of the hearing officer and no reversible error in the record, we affirm the decision and order of the hearing officer as reformed.
At the outset we note that in a number instances the hearing officer uses the year “2001” in dates when he is clearly talking about the year “2000.” We correct these typographical errors by reforming the hearing officer’s decision read “2000” wherever he uses “2001” in his Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the portion of his decision entitled “Decision.” We note specifically that this makes the date of the claimant’s injury___________. This date of injury conforms to the hearing officer’s “Statement of the Evidence” and the evidence before the hearing officer.
The hearing officer’s resolution of the injury, date of injury, timely report of the injury, carrier waiver of compensability, and disability issues turn on factual determinations on which there was conflicting evidence. Section 410.165(a) provides that the contested case hearing officer, as finder of fact, is the sole judge of the relevance and materiality of the evidence as well as of the weight and credibility that is to be given the evidence. It was for the hearing officer, as trier of fact, to resolve the inconsistencies and conflicts in the evidence. Garza v. Commercial Insurance Company of Newark, New Jersey, 508 S.W.2d 701, 702 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, no writ). This is equally true regarding medical evidence. Texas Employers Insurance Association v. Campos, 666 S.W.2d 286, 290 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ). The trier of fact may believe all, part, or none of the testimony of any witness. Taylor v. Lewis, 553 S.W.2d 153, 161 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1977, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Aetna Insurance Co. v. English, 204 S.W.2d 850 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1947, no writ). An appeals-level body is not a fact finder and does not normally pass upon the credibility of witnesses or substitute its own judgment for that of the trier of fact, even if the evidence would support a different result. National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania v. Soto, 819 S.W.2d 619, 620 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1991, writ denied). When reviewing a hearing officer’s decision for factual sufficiency of the evidence we should reverse such decision only if it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust. Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986); Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tex. 1986).
Applying this standard, we find no basis to overturn the hearing officer’s factual findings or his resolution of the issues before him which were based upon those factual determinations.
The decision and order of the hearing officer are affirmed as reformed.
The carrier represented at the CCH that the true corporate name of the insurance carrier is CONTINENTAL CASUALTY CO. and the name and address of its registered agent for service of process is
CT CORP
350 N. ST. PAUL ST.
DALLAS, TX. 75201.
Gary L. Kilgore – Appeals Judge
CONCUR:
Robert W. Potts – Appeals Judge
CONCURRING OPINION:
I support the result because of waiver, and the failure to the carrier to timely react to written notices received earlier than January 10, 2001. However, I believe that the record shows that the claimant has an ordinary disease of life and evidence supporting the causal connection (versus the symptomatic connection) of a “reactive airways disease” to the alleged inhalations amount to no more than speculation or guess and do not rise to reasonable medical probability.
Susan M. Kelley – Appeals Judge