This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 et seq. (1989 Act). This case is back before us after our remand in Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 011715, decided September 17, 2001. In Appeal No. 011715 we had remanded for the hearing officer to obtain the carrier service information in compliance with HB 2600, effective June 17, 2001. The hearing officer complied with the remand and obtained this information. On remand the hearing officer reissued essentially the same decision as she issued after the contested case hearing (CCH) which was held on June 19, 2001. In her decision the hearing officer resolved the issues before her by determining that the respondent (claimant herein) sustained a compensable injury; that the claimant had good cause for failing to timely report his injury because the claimant initially trivialized the injury; that the claimant did not make an election of remedies; and that the claimant had disability beginning on ___________, continuing through the date of the CCH. The appellant (carrier herein) files a request for review and challenges the hearing officer’s resolution of the injury, timely report of injury, and disability issues on factual sufficiency grounds. There is no response to the carrier’s request for review from the claimant in the appeal file.
DECISION
Finding sufficient evidence to support the decision of the hearing officer and no reversible error in the record, we affirm the decision and order of the hearing officer.
The hearing officer’s resolution of the injury, timely report of the injury, and disability issues turn on factual determinations on which there was conflicting evidence. Section 410.165(a) provides that the contested case hearing officer, as finder of fact, is the sole judge of the relevance and materiality of the evidence as well as of the weight and credibility that is to be given the evidence. It was for the hearing officer, as trier of fact, to resolve the inconsistencies and conflicts in the evidence. Garza v. Commercial Insurance Company of Newark, New Jersey, 508 S.W.2d 701, 702 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, no writ). This is equally true regarding medical evidence. Texas Employers Insurance Association v. Campos, 666 S.W.2d 286, 290 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ). The trier of fact may believe all, part, or none of the testimony of any witness. Taylor v. Lewis, 553 S.W.2d 153, 161 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1977, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Aetna Insurance Co. v. English, 204 S.W.2d 850 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1947, no writ). An appeals-level body is not a fact finder and does not normally pass upon the credibility of witnesses or substitute its own judgment for that of the trier of fact, even if the evidence would support a different result. National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania v. Soto, 819 S.W.2d 619, 620 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1991, writ denied). When reviewing a hearing officer’s decision for factual sufficiency of the evidence we should reverse such decision only if it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust. Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986); Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tex. 1986). Applying this standard, we find no basis to o ver turn the hearing officer’s factual findings or his resolution of the issues before him which were based upon those factual determinations.
The decision and order of the hearing officer are affirmed.
The true corporate name of the insurance carrier is AMERICAN HOME ASSURANCE COMPANY and the name and address of its registered agent for service of process is
CORPORATION SERVICE COMPANY
800 BRAZOS, SUITE 750, COMMODORE I
AUSTIN, TEXAS 78701.
Gary L. Kilgore – Appeals Judge
CONCUR:
Judy L. S. Barnes – Appeals Judge
Elaine M. Chaney – Appeals Judge