This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 et seq. (1989 Act). A contested case hearing (CCH) was held on October 9, 2001. The hearing officer determined that the respondent (claimant) sustained a compensable injury on __________, and that she had disability from May 29, 2001, through July 23, 2001. The appellant (self-insured) appeals those determinations on sufficiency of the evidence grounds, and also contends that the claimant refused to relinquish prior medical records; that the claimant did not timely respond to the self-insured’s interrogatories, thereby blocking the self-insured from obtaining information; and that the hearing officer should not have denied the motion for a continuance of the CCH. The file does not contain a response from the claimant.
DECISION
Affirmed.
As to the self-insured’s contentions about failure to relinquish prior records, untimely response to interrogatories, and denial of a continuance, the hearing officer provided a reasoned explanation for each of his rulings. In view of his stated rationale for each ruling, we cannot agree that the hearing officer acted without reference to guiding rules and principles; therefore, we find no merit to these contentions. Morrow v. H.E.B., Inc., 714 S.W.2d 297 (Tex. 1986).
Section 410.165(a) provides that the hearing officer, as finder of fact, is the sole judge of the relevance and materiality of the evidence as well as of the weight and credibility that is to be given the evidence. It was for the hearing officer, as trier of fact, to resolve the inconsistencies and conflicts in the evidence. Garza v. Commercial Insurance Company of Newark, New Jersey, 508 S.W.2d 701 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, no writ). This is equally true regarding medical evidence. Texas Employers Insurance Association v. Campos, 666 S.W.2d 286 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ). The trier of fact may believe all, part, or none of the testimony of any witness. Aetna Insurance Company v. English, 204 S.W.2d 850 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1947, no writ). When reviewing a hearing officer’s decision for factual sufficiency of the evidence, we should reverse such decision only if it is so contrary to the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust. Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986); Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tex. 1986). Applying this standard, we find no grounds to reverse the factual findings of the hearing officer.
We affirm the decision and order of the hearing officer.
The true corporate name of the insurance carrier is (SELF-INSURED) and the name and address of its registered agent for service of process is
SUPERINTENDENT
(ADDRESS)
(CITY), TEXAS (ZIP CODE).
Michael B. McShane – Appeals Judge
CONCUR:
Philip F. O’Neill – Appeals Judge
Robert W. Potts – Appeals Judge