This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 et seq. (1989 Act). A contested case hearing was held on October 2, 2001. The hearing officer determined that the compensable injury of ___________, extends to and includes an injury to the right wrist, but does not extend to or include injuries to the cervical or lumbar spine.
The appellant (claimant) appealed, arguing essentially that the hearing officer’s decision is against the great weight of the evidence and manifestly unjust. The respondent (self-insured) filed a response urging affirmance of the hearing officer’s decision.
DECISION
Affirmed.
The parties stipulated that the claimant sustained a compensable injury on ___________. The claimant testified that she slipped and fell on a waxed floor at work and injured her right wrist, right hip, and right knee. The claimant underwent surgery for her right knee injury on October 16, 2000, and after the surgery she experienced headaches and pain in her back. Since the self-insured accepted that the compensable injury of ___________, extends to and includes an injury to the right wrist, the only issue before the hearing officer was whether the compensable injury of ___________, extends to and includes the cervical and lumbar spine.
The evidence sufficiently supports the hearing officer’s determination that the claimant’s compensable injury of ___________, does not extend to or include injuries to the cervical and lumbar spine. Section 401.011(26). Extent of injury is a fact question for the hearing officer. Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 960407, decided April 10, 1996. The hearing officer was not persuaded by the claimant’s testimony or the medical records in evidence that the claimant’s compensable injury extended to or included injuries to the cervical and lumbar spine. The hearing officer opined that the medical records indicated that “the claimant has degenerative disc disease of the cervical and lumbar spines.”
It is the hearing officer, as the sole judge of the weight and credibility of the evidence (Section 410.165(a)), who resolves the conflicts and inconsistencies in the evidence (Garza v. Commercial Insurance Company of Newark, New Jersey, 508 S.W.2d 701 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, no writ)), and determines what facts have been established from the conflicting evidence. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Company v. Escalera, 385 S.W.2d 477 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1964, writ ref’d n.r.e.). This is equally true of medical evidence. Texas Employers Insurance Association v. Campos, 666 S.W.2d 286 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ). The Appeals Panel will not disturb the challenged factual findings of a hearing officer unless they are so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be clearly wrong or manifestly unjust and we do not find them so in this case. Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986); In re King’s Estate, 150 Tex. 662, 244 S.W.2d 660 (1951).
The decision and order of the hearing officer are affirmed.
The true corporate name of the self-insured is (A SELF-INSURED) and the name and address of its registered agent for service of process is
BO
BUSINESS MANAGER
(ADDRESS)
(CITY), TEXAS (ZIP CODE).
Michael B. McShane – Appeals Judge
CONCUR:
Judy L. S. Barnes – Appeals Judge
Philip F. O’Neill – Appeals Judge