This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 et seq. (1989 Act). A contested case hearing was held on October 22, 2001. The hearing officer resolved the disputed issues before him by determining that the appellant (carrier) is not relieved of liability under Section 409.002 because the respondent (claimant) did timely notify her employer of her claimed injury pursuant to Section 409.001; that the date of injury, pursuant to Section 408.007, the date the claimant knew or should have known the disease may be related to her employment, is __________; that the claimant did sustain a repetitive trauma injury; and that the claimant had disability resulting from the compensable injury beginning on August 5, 2001, and continuing through August 19, 2001. The carrier appealed on sufficiency of evidence grounds and there is no response from the claimant in the file.
DECISION
Affirmed.
The claimant testified that she was employed as a customer service representative for the employer for more than four years; that her job entailed taking calls from customers and entering data into a computer seven hours per day; that her workstation was not comfortable in that her computer was placed too high causing her to raise her chair so that her feet did not touch the ground; that she first felt pain in her right wrist with tingling and numbness in her fingers on __________; that she reported the injury to her supervisor that same day; and that prior to __________, she had no problems or symptoms with her wrist: She further stated that on January 26, 2001, she reported to her supervisor that both of her wrists and arms were in pain and that on April 4, 2001, she struck her elbow on her desk at work and sought medical treatment for both the elbow and her wrists. The claimant’s supervisor testified that the claimant did report she was having pain in her right arm and wrist on __________, and that he understood it to be work related. He further testified that the claimant came to him about a month later and reported that the pain was in both arms and wrists. The records indicate that the claimant was placed “on unable to work” status for both her elbow and wrists on April 9, 2001, and released to work with restrictions on August 20, 2001. The claimant testified that she reached maximum medical improvement (MMI) for her compensable right elbow injury at the end of July 2001, and did in fact return to work with restrictions on August 20, 2001. On appeal, the carrier asserts that the claimant failed to meet her burden of proof to show that she sustained a compensable injury to her wrists, and that the claimant was experiencing problems with her wrists long before November 1, 2000, and that the claimant only brought the new claim because she had reached MMI for her elbow injury.
As the carrier properly points out in its appeal, this case turns on the credibility of the evidence. The claimant had the burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that she sustained a compensable injury in the course and scope of employment. Johnson v. Employers Reinsurance Corporation, 351 S.W.2d 936 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1961, no writ). The hearing officer is the sole judge of the weight and credibility of the evidence. Section 410.165(a). The hearing officer resolves conflicts and inconsistencies in the evidence, including the medical evidence. Texas Employers Insurance Association v. Campos, 666 S.W.2d 286 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ). To this end, the hearing officer as fact finder may believe all, part, or none of the testimony of any witness. The testimony of a claimant as an interested party raises only an issue of fact for the hearing officer to resolve. National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania v. Soto, 819 S.W.2d 619, 620 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1991, writ denied). When reviewing a hearing officer’s decision, we will reverse such decision only if it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust. Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986); Pool v. Ford Motor Company, 715 S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tex. 1986). Injury may be proven by the testimony of the claimant alone and objective medical evidence is not required to establish that particular conduct resulted in the claimed injury, except in those cases where the subject is so technical in nature that a fact finder lacks the ability from common knowledge to find a causal basis. Both the claimant and her supervisor testified that the claimant reported a work-related injury on __________. Although the carrier contends that the claimant had experienced symptoms long before that time, the claimant testified that __________, was the first date she ever experienced any problems with her right wrist. Nothing in our review of the record indicates that the challenged determinations are so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be clearly wrong or manifestly unjust.
The hearing officer’s decision and order are affirmed.
The true corporate name of the insurance carrier is AMERICAN HOME ASSURANCE COMPANY and the name and address of its registered agent for service of process is
CORPORATION SERVICE COMPANY
800 BRAZOS, SUITE 750, COMMODORE I
AUSTIN, TEXAS 78701.
Philip F. O’Neill – Appeals Judge
CONCUR:
Gary L. Kilgore – Appeals Judge
Robert E. Lang
Appeals Panel
Manager/Judge