This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 et seq. (1989 Act). A contested case hearing was held on October 23, 2001. With respect to the single issue before him, the hearing officer determined that the compensable injury sustained by the respondent (claimant) on ___________, includes the cervical spine. On appeal, the appellant (self-insured) contends that the hearing officer’s extent-of-injury determination is against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. In her response, the claimant urges affirmance.
DECISION
Affirmed.
At issue in this case is whether the hearing officer erred in determining that the compensable injury sustained by the claimant on ___________, includes the cervical spine. Conflicting evidence was presented on that issue at the hearing. Extent of injury is a question of fact for the hearing officer to resolve. Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 93613, decided August 24, 1993. The self-insured has cited Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 962342, decided January 6, 1997, and Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 000478, decided April 13, 2000, both of which affirm the hearing officer’s determination that the compensable injury did not extend to and include the cervical spine. However, those decision affirmed determinations that the compensable injury did not extend to the neck under a sufficiency standard of review. They do not, as the self-insured asserts, stand for the general proposition that, as a matter of law, a compensable injury cannot include the cervical spine simply because there was a lapse in time between the compensable injury and a complaint of pain related to the cervical area. Rather, such a delay is a matter for the hearing officer to consider in resolving the extent issue.
Section 410.165(a) provides that the contested case hearing officer, as finder of fact, is the sole judge of the relevance and materiality of the evidence as well as of the weight and credibility that is to be given the evidence. It was for the hearing officer, as trier of fact, to resolve the inconsistencies and conflicts in the evidence and to decide what facts the evidence has established. Garza v. Commercial Ins. Co., 508 S.W.2d 701, 702 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, no writ). An appeals level body is not a fact finder, and does not normally pass upon the credibility of witnesses or substitute its own judgment for that of the trier of fact, even if the evidence would support a different result. National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Soto, 819 S.W.2d 619, 620 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1991, writ denied). When reviewing a hearing officer’s decision for factual sufficiency of the evidence we should reverse such decision only if it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust and we do not so find here. Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986).
Accordingly, we affirm the hearing officer’s decision and order.
The true corporate name of the self-insured is (SELF-INSURED) and the name and address of its registered agent for service of process is
NAME
3700 ROSS AVENUE
DALLAS, TEXAS 75204.
Elaine M. Chaney – Appeals Judge
CONCUR:
Thomas A. Knapp – Appeals Judge
Philip F. O’Neill – Appeals Judge