This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 et seq. (1989 Act). A contested case hearing was held on October 22, 2001. With respect to the issues before him, the hearing officer determined that the respondent (claimant) sustained a compensable injury on ___________; that the compensable injury includes traumatic brain injury, post concussion syndrome, the lumbar and cervical spine, headaches, vertigo, memory loss, disequilibrium, and right eye vision problems; and that the claimant had disability from ___________, through the date of the hearing. The appellant (carrier) contends that there is insufficient evidence to support these determinations. The appeal file contains no response from the claimant.
DECISION
Affirmed.
The claimant had the burden to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that she sustained a compensable injury on ___________, and thereafter had disability, and these issues presented the hearing officer with questions of fact to resolve. Injury and disability determinations can be established by the claimant’s testimony alone, if believed by the hearing officer. Gee v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 765 S.W.2d 394 (Tex. 1989). The hearing officer is the sole judge of the weight and credibility of the evidence. Section 410.165(a). It is for the hearing officer to resolve such conflicts and inconsistencies in the evidence as were present in this case and to determine what facts the evidence has established. Garza v. Commercial Ins. Co., 508 S.W.2d 701 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, no writ). The Appeals Panel will not disturb the challenged factual findings of a hearing officer unless they are so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be clearly wrong or manifestly unjust and we do not so find them here. Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986); In re King’s Estate, 150 Tex. 662, 224 S.W.2d 660 (1951).
With respect to the extent-of-injury determination, the carrier contends that because headache, vertigo, memory loss, disequilibrium, and right eye vision problems are “merely symptoms” and not injured body parts, they do not qualify as part of the compensable injury. We find no merit in this assertion. We note that the carrier did not object to the phrasing of the extent issue in terms of whether certain diagnoses were part of the compensable injury. Thus, we find no error in the hearing officer’s having resolved the issue before him. The carrier further argues that the hearing officer’s findings are contradictory because he determined that the compensable injury does not extend to a right eye injury, but does extend to right eye vision problems. We disagree. An injury to the eye and a vision problem are not identical conditions, and we perceive no error in the hearing officer’s clarification of the compensability issue concerning the right eye.
The hearing officer’s decision and order are affirmed.
The true corporate name of the carrier is ZURICH AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY and the name and address of its registered agent for service of process is
GARY SUDOL
9330 LBJ FREEWAY, SUITE 1200
DALLAS, TEXAS 75243.
Elaine M. Chaney – Appeals Judge
CONCUR:
Gary L. Kilgore – Appeals Judge
Robert E. Lang
Appeals Panel
Manager/Judge