This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 et seq. (1989 Act). A contested case hearing was held on October 9, 2001. The hearing officer resolved the disputed issues by concluding that the respondent/cross-appellant (claimant) sustained an on-the-job injury on ___________, which prevented him from earning preinjury wages from April 6, 2001, to July 23, 2001, and that the claimant failed to timely notify his employer of the injury and did not have good cause for such failure to do so.
The claimant appeals the adverse finding that he did not timely report his injury, arguing that the finding is so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and manifestly unjust. In response, the appellant/cross-respondent (carrier) contends that the credible evidence indicates that the claimant failed to timely report that he was injured in the course and scope of his employment. In its cross-appeal, the carrier appeals the hearing officer’s determinations regarding compensability and disability, arguing that the claimant failed to meet his burden of proof. The appeal file does not contain a response to the carrier’s cross-appeal from the claimant.
DECISION
Affirmed.
The claimant testified that he worked as a packing operator for the employer and that his job required him to lift bags weighing 50 to 55 pounds. He said that on ___________, he was lifting bags off of a conveyor belt when he felt a burning sensation in his leg. The claimant testified that the pain continued to get worse and at some time after ___________, he asked a supervisor to take him to first aid. The claimant’s supervisor, Mr. M, acknowledged in a recorded statement that the claimant reported that his leg was injured but stated that the claimant did not allege that the injury was work related but rather said he did not know why his leg was hurting.
The question of whether an injury occurred is one of fact. Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 93854, decided November 9, 1993; Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 93449, decided July 21, 1993. Section 410.165(a) provides that the contested case hearing officer, as finder of fact, is the sole judge of the relevance and materiality of the evidence as well as of the weight and credibility that is to be given the evidence. It was for the hearing officer, as trier of fact, to resolve the inconsistencies and conflicts in the evidence. Garza v. Commercial Insurance Company of Newark, New Jersey, 508 S.W.2d 701, 702 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, no writ). The trier of fact may believe all, part, or none of the testimony of any witness. Taylor v. Lewis, 553 S.W.2d 153, 161 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1977, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Aetna Insurance Co. v. English, 204 S.W.2d 850 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1947, no writ). An appeals-level body is not a fact finder and does not normally pass upon the credibility of witnesses or substitute its own judgment for that of the trier of fact, even if the evidence would support a different result. National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania v. Soto, 819 S.W.2d 619, 620 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1991, writ denied). When reviewing a hearing officer’s decision for factual sufficiency of the evidence, we should reverse such decision only if it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust. Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986); Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tex. 1986). It is not so in this case.
Disability is also a question of fact to be determined by the hearing officer. Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 93560, decided August 19, 1993. Disability can be established by a claimant’s testimony alone, even if contradictory of medical testimony. Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 92285, decided August 14, 1992; Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 92167, decided June 11, 1992. Applying our standard of review outlined above, we find no error in the hearing officer’s finding concerning disability.
The claimant contends that the hearing officer erred in determining that he did not timely report his injury and that he did not have good cause for failing to timely report his injury. To the extent he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the hearing officer’s decision, we note that, generally, a claimant must report an injury to his or her employer within the requisite 30-day period (Section 409.001) unless there is good cause for the failure to timely report the injury. Section 409.002(2). The claimant has the burden to prove good cause. Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 94114, decided March 3, 1994. The test for good cause is that of ordinary prudence or “that degree of diligence that an ordinary person would have exercised under the same or similar circumstances,” and it is within the purview of the hearing officer to determine what ordinary prudence is, under the circumstances. Id. The notice given by the employee, while it need not be detailed, should, at a minimum, apprise the employer of the general nature of the injury and the fact that it is work related. Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 951613, decided November 10, 1995. A claimant must act with diligence in notifying the employer of a claim. Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 93649, decided September 8, 1993. The record here reflects that the claimant reported to his supervisor that his leg was hurting, but there is conflicting evidence regarding what information the claimant provided as to the cause of the pain.
The claimant cites Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 961148, decided July 24, 1996, arguing that the evidence was sufficient to establish that he timely reported his injury. However, in Appeal No. 961148, the injury alleged was the aggravation of a previous foot condition. The claimant in that case provided a doctor’s note which recited that long periods of walking tend to aggravate “these kinds of feet.” The employee had presented the note asking for a transfer to an area where she would not have to walk as much. The Appeals Panel concluded that this information was sufficient to notify the employer in that case of a claimed work-related aggravation injury. While the recorded statement from Mr. M discusses the fact that the claimant thought his pain might be due to the extensive period of time he was standing, the statement went on to say that when asked why his leg was hurting the claimant replied that he did not know. Further, a recorded statement from Mr. H indicated that he overheard the claimant attribute his symptoms to arthritis. Appeal No. 961148 is distinguishable on its facts.
The decision and order of the hearing officer are affirmed.
The true corporate name of the insurance carrier is LIBERTY MUTUAL FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY and the name and address of its registered agent for service of process is
C T CORPORATION SYSTEMS
350 NORTH ST. PAUL, SUITE 2900
DALLAS, TEXAS 75201.
Gary L. Kilgore – Appeals Judge
CONCUR:
Susan M. Kelley – Appeals Judge
Thomas A. Knapp – Appeals Judge