This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 et seq. (1989 Act). A contested case hearing (CCH) was held on September 24, 2001. The hearing officer resolved the disputed issues by concluding that on __________, the appellant (claimant) did not sustain a compensable repetitive trauma injury and that, therefore, there can be no resultant disability. The claimant appeals, asserting that the hearing officer’s decision is against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. The respondent (self-insured) responds, urging affirmance.
DECISION
Affirmed.
The claimant testified that she began working for the self-insured in 1976, doing various jobs. She stated that she did not work for the self-insured from 1980 to 1984. She testified that she transferred to the (city 1) plant in July 2000, although she missed several months of work due to pneumonia and acute bronchitis. According to the evidence, the claimant did not begin her last position until April 11, 2001; at the CCH the claimant claimed her date of repetitive trauma injury as __________. She testified that she stayed on the job until May 10, 2001, and has not worked since because of pain. The claimant alleged that she injured both wrists, both elbows, her neck, and her lower back due to repetitive tasks required in her last position.
The claimant testified that beginning April 11, 2001, she began work in brake installation for the self-insured. She stated that she was trained for the position and that during her training period she initially performed only about one-fourth of the work (she observed the remainder of the time) and increased the proportionate share of work performed until she completed all of the necessary work herself. She testified that part of her job duties included using pushpins to secure the brake line to the frame and that sometimes the pushpins damaged and were open causing them to be impossible to secure to the frame. The claimant’s supervisor testified that when the pushpins were already open it was necessary to reset them before they were inserted into the hole in the frame. The claimant’s supervisor additionally testified that the problem with the pins was a nuisance and a frustration to the workers, but, in his opinion, would not cause an injury. The self-insured performed an industrial engineering injury investigation, dated May 23, 2001, and the resulting ergonomic analysis reported that no ergo stressors were identified.
A medical report dated June 21, 2001, authored by radiologist Dr. B, indicated that there is evidence of multi-segmental degenerative disc disease. The claimant’s treating doctor stated in a medical report that it was his opinion that the claimant suffered lumbar and cervical spine pain as well as bilateral elbow and wrist pain as a direct result of performing repetitive tasks during her employment with the self-insured.
A fact finder is not bound by medical evidence when that evidence is manifestly dependent upon the credibility of the information given by the claimant. Rowland v. Standard Fire Insurance Company, 489 S.W.2d 151 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1972, writ ref’d n.r.e.).A “compensable injury” means “an injury that arises out of and in the course and scope of employment for which compensation is payable under this subtitle.” Section 401.011(10). The claimant had the burden of proving that she sustained a compensable injury as claimed. Johnson v. Employers Reinsurance Corporation, 351 S.W.2d 936 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1961, no writ). Whether she did so was a question of fact for the hearing officer to decide. Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 93449, decided July 21, 1993.
Section 410.165(a) provides that the hearing officer is the sole judge of the weight and credibility of the evidence. She was not persuaded by the claimant’s evidence that she met her burden of proof and resolved the credibility question against the claimant. We will reverse a factual determination of a hearing officer only if that determination is so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust. Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986); Pool v. Ford Motor Company, 715 S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tex. 1986). Applying this standard of review to the record of this case, we find the evidence sufficient to support the determination of the hearing officer that the claimant did not sustain a compensable injury. We also find no error in the hearing officer’s determination that the claimant did not have disability, as the 1989 Act requires a finding of the existence of a compensable injury as prerequisite to a finding of disability. Section 401.011(16).
The claimant alleges that the hearing officer did not review the medical evidence. In Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 94121, decided March 11, 1994, the Appeals Panel stated that the 1989 Act does not require a statement of the evidence in the Decision and Order and that omitting part of the evidence was not error. The hearing officer stated that even though all of the evidence presented was not discussed it was considered. The failure to summarize all of the evidence was not reversible error.
The decision and order of the hearing officer are affirmed.
The true corporate name of the insurance carrier is (SELF-INSURED EMPLOYER) and the name and address of its registered agent for service of process is
C T CORPORATION
350 N. ST. PAUL STREET
DALLAS, TEXAS 75201.
Gary L. Kilgore – Appeals Judge
CONCUR:
Elaine M. Chaney – Appeals Judge
Robert W. Potts – Appeals Judge