This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 et seq. (1989 Act). A contested case hearing was held on October 25, 2001. With regard to the sole issue before him, he determined that the respondent’s (claimant) cervical spine is part of the compensable injury of ___________. The appellant (carrier) appealed, arguing that the hearing officer erred in determining compensability. The claimant filed a response urging affirmance.
DECISION
Affirmed.
The parties stipulated that on ___________, the claimant sustained a compensable injury including his low back and left knee. The claimant stated that he had surgery to his left knee on February 13, 1999, and that his leg was in a cast for six months. The claimant complained to the carrier regarding his neck pain seven months after the date of injury when his cast was removed. The claimant stated that he injured his neck when he slipped and fell backwards at work on ___________; however, at the time, he was preoccupied with the severity of the injury to his leg. The claimant stated that he continuously complained about his back and neck pain to his doctors.
The hearing officer determined that the claimant sustained injury to his cervical spine in the course and scope of employment on ___________. We have held that extent of injury is a fact question for the hearing officer. Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 960407, decided April 10, 1996. The hearing officer was persuaded by the claimant’s testimony and medical reports in evidence that the claimant sustained a compensable injury to his neck. The evidence sufficiently supports the hearing officer’s determination regarding compensability.
It is the hearing officer, as the sole judge of the weight and credibility of the evidence (Section 410.165(a)), who resolves the conflicts and inconsistencies in the evidence (Garza v. Commercial Insurance Company of Newark, New Jersey, 508 S.W.2d 701 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, no writ)), and determines what facts have been established from the conflicting evidence. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Company v. Escalera, 385 S.W.2d 477 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1964, writ ref’d n.r.e.). This is equally true of medical evidence. Texas Employers Insurance Association v. Campos, 666 S.W.2d 286 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ). The Appeals Panel will not disturb the challenged factual findings of a hearing officer unless they are so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be clearly wrong or manifestly unjust and we do not find them so in this case. Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986); In re King’s Estate, 150 Tex. 662, 244 S.W.2d 660 (1951).
The decision and order of the hearing officer are affirmed.
The true corporate name of the insurance carrier is GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA and the name and address of its registered agent for service of process is
LINDA LEWIS
SAFECO
1600 NORTH COLLINS RD. #300
RICHARDSON, TEXAS 75080.
Michael B. McShane – Appeals Judge
CONCUR:
Elaine M. Chaney – Appeals Judge
Robert W. Potts – Appeals Judge